Duquesne Law Review
Volume 4

Number 1

Article 10

1965

Radio Frequency Allocation in the Public Interest: Federal
Government and Civilian Use
Stanley D. Metzger
Bernie R. Burrus

Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr
Part of the Communications Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Stanley D. Metzger & Bernie R. Burrus, Radio Frequency Allocation in the Public Interest: Federal
Government and Civilian Use, 4 Duq. L. Rev. 1 (1965).
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol4/iss1/10

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection.

DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 4

1965-1966

NUMBER 1

RADIO FREQUENCY ALLOCATION IN THE PUBLIC
INTEREST: FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND
CIVILIAN USE*
STANLEY D. METZGER** and BERNIE R. BURRUSt
INTRODUCTION
It has long been recognized that the radio frequency spectrum is a
vital natural resource requiring government allocation and regulation.'
The resource is a fixed or finite one, and has many claimants for its use.
Moreover, as the Communications Satellite Program demonstrates, the
problem of physical limitation is an accelerating one, as new uses increase
the saturation of available spectrum space. Indeed, President Truman's
statement of fifteen years ago would appear particularly appropriate
today. At that time, February 17, 1950, Mr. Truman said:
The most pressing communications problem at this particular
time, however, is the scarcity of radio frequencies in relation to
the steadily growing demand. Increasing difficulty is being experienced in meeting the demand for frequencies domestically
and even greater difficulty is encountered internationally in attempting to agree upon the allocation of available frequencies
among the nations of the world.
In the face of this growing shortage the problem of assuring
an equitable distribution of the available supply of frequencies
and private, is rapidly
among all claimants, both Government
2
assuming major prominence.
* This article is a portion of a study which was conducted under contract with Motorola,
Inc. The authors enjoyed complete freedom to conduct this study as they saw fit. In consequence, Motorola, Inc. is not responsible for the analyses and conclusions herein.
** A.B., LL.B., Cornell University. Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law
Center.
t B.S., University of Houston; M.P.A., Princeton University; LL.B, New York University. Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
1. See, e.g., Report, "Satellite Communications," of Military. Operations Subcommittee
of the Committee on Government Operations, October 1964, [Subcommittee Print], pp. 75-87.
2. Quoted in Hearings, Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce of the House of Representatives, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., June 8, 9, 1959, p. 23.
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It is difficult enough to allocate a scarce resource which is subject to
increasing demands. Were there no other problem, the United States
Government would have difficulty enough to divide the radio spectrum
among the competing demands of television broadcasting, mobile land
service, satellite commercial communications, and the other legitimate
uses which constantly call for greater frequency allocations. When to
these pressures there is added the competition of Federal Government
use of radio frequencies for national security reasons, it is apparent that
the problem of organization and management requires the most efficient,
effective and equitable system of distribution 3and control of frequencies
as can be accomplished in the public interest.
At present, government management is bifurcated. The Federal Communications Commission is charged with responsibility for the assignment and regulation of frequencies utilized by domestic private users,
and state and local government users (including police, fire department,
etc.),' whereas the President is responsible for the allocation of frequencies to Federal Government users. This latter responsibility the President
. has delegated to the Director of Telecommunications Management with
the assistance of the Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee
(IRAC) . Dual control engenders inevitable conflicts, which are compounded when different standards and procedures are employed by the
different control bodies.' As Mr. Fellows of The National Association
of Broadcasters pointed out in the 1959 Hearings on Spectrum Allocation:
The basic problem, here, lies in the fact that there are two
users of vital spectrum space- [Federal] Government and nonGovernment [civilian]-with each of them operating under different ground rules.
The non-Government [civilian] users of the spectrum must
justify to the Federal Communications Commission in public
proceedings their need for and utilization of the portions of the
spectrum which may be allocated to their particular services.
However, although all the non-Government [civilian] users
present information of use and justification for what they request in the spectrum, similar information is not submitted with
respect to the [Federal] Government use of the spectrum which
might indicate how the entire natural resource could best be
3. Id. at 24 (testimony of Mr. Stewart).
4. Federal Communications Act of 1934, Secs. 301, 303. Throughout this study, the
term "civilian" will be employed to characterize those who must secure F.C.C. authorization
for frequencies, etc., while "Federal Government" will be used to describe those who
receive authorization from the President.
5. See Executive Order 10995.
6. See Report, note 1, at 86.
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utilized. The [Federal] Government users are not required to
justify before Congress, public opinion, or any impartial body,
7
their use of frequencies.
It can thus be seen that while the allocation of radio frequencies, because of the increasingly pressing demands of both Federal Government
and civilian, poses serious problems, the unusual aspect of the problem of
radio frequency allocation is that there is no organized procedure for
assessing the competing demands of Federal Government and civilian
use. Instead of a management structure which assigns the available supply
of frequencies among all claimants in accordance with a judgment as to
how best the public interest may be served, the claims of Federal Government use are "negotiated" between the President's designated agent and
the Federal Communications Commission rather than subjected to comparative examination with other competing uses in an effort to determine
wherein lies the public interest.
There can be no doubt, of course, that the security of our country is a
paramount consideration in any assessment of the public interest in the
allocation of radio frequencies, as it is in the allocation of other scarce
resources, including manpower and materials. It is likewise undoubted
that it is not the solitary consideration that the problem here, as in so
many other fields, is to allocate resources so that just proportions shall
go to deserving users, so that a fully informed judgment of the public
interest may be made in any allocation decision, and, most important
of all, so that any potential user should have the same opportunity to
make a case for allocation of resources as any other user.
This study has for its purpose an evaluation of the efficacy of the
present system of radio frequency allocation between Federal Government and civilian use. It will examine the history of the present system of radio frequency allocation; describe the present allocation and
assignment practices; evaluate the present system in terms of the public
interest; and, finally, make such recommendations for improvement in
the present system as are indicated.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
This section will trace the origins and development of the current
scheme of frequency assignments in both the Federal Government and
civilian spheres.
A. 1910-1926

The earliest federal law having any relation to radio communication
was the Act of June 24, 1910,' as amended by the Act of July 23, 1912. 9
7. Hearings, note 2, at 36.
8. Wireless Ship Act of 1910, 36 STAT. 629.
9. 37 STAT. 199.
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This legislation, however, was neither of a regulatory nor a licensing character and had no provision with respect to the assignment of radio frequencies. Rather, the legislation was addressed to safety requirements,
necessitating installation of wireless apparatus and operators on large
seagoing passenger vessels. The Act of 1912 extended the requirement to
large cargo ships and made both Acts applicable to the Great Lakes.
Enforcement was placed in the Secretary of Commerce and Labor, who
at that time administered the domestic maritime navigation laws.
Even as early as 1912, however, the general use of the wireless, particularly as an aid to maritime use, had increased until some form of
regulation became imperative. Radio interference from ship and shore
stations had affected the radio activities of the Army, Navy and Coast
Guard.' ° The Radio Act of 1912" was the result of this situation. The
purpose of the Act was set forth by the Senate Committee which reported
out the bill:
Radio communication has already demonstrated its value as
an agency for promoting the security of life and property at sea,
and under proper supervision and regulation that value can be
greatly increased. The most important purpose of this bill is to
regulate that agency so as to attain that end so far as the committee by past experience has been able to judge situations
which have arisen and provide for situations which may arise
calling for its use. 2
In its regulatory and licensing features the Act was the "first comprehensive piece of national legislation specifically directed toward the control of radio communications."' 8
The text of the Act is summarized in the margin.' 4 Significantly for
10. DAVIS, LAW Or RADIO COzMrtNICATION 33 ff.(1927).

11. 37 STAT. 302.
12. S. Report No. 698, 62d Cong., p. 5.
13. MAcQuIVEY, FREQUENCY ASSIGNMENT ADMINISTRATIVE CoNTROL 59 (1956).
14. Section 1 of the Act required that any person, company or corporation obtain
a license from the Secretary of Labor and Commerce before engaging in any form of
interstate or foreign communication by radio at any place within the jurisdiction of the
United States except the Philippine Islands. Section 2 authorized the Secretary to prescribe
the form and restrictions of a license, and provided that the license should specify the location
and ownership of a station, and "shall state the wave length or the wave lengths
authorized for use by the station for the prevention of interference and the hours for
which the station is licensed for work." Section 2 also contained a clause authorizing the
President in time of war, public peril or disaster to take over the operation of any station
or its apparatus upon just compensation to the owners. Section 3 required that the communications apparatus be at all times in the charge of a person licensed for that purpose
by the Secretary.
Section 4 prescribed detailed regulations for station operation, which were intended to
minimize interference. Significantly, the first regulation prohibited licensed stations from
using any wave length between 600 and 1600 meters since that band had been reserved
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present purposes, however, section 2 contained a clause authorizing the
President in time of war, public peril or disaster to take over the operation of any station or its apparatus upon just compensation to the owners
[the forebear of section 606 of the Communications Act of 1934]. In
addition, a regulation promulgated pursuant to section 4 prohibited licensed stations from using any wave lengths within a band reserved
specifically for Federal Government use.' 5
It should be noted that the 1912 Act, though a licensing act, did not
specifically confer upon the Secretary the authority to assign frequencies.
As will be later observed, the question of whether the power to license
was ministerial or discretionary loomed very important in the 1920's."
In the 1912 Act, however, there was sown the seed of separate treatment
of Federal Government and civilian allocations. Civilian use was subject
to the licensing provision, Federal Government use was not.
The Act presented no regulatory nor allocation problems at its inception, since marine and amateur interests were the primary users of
radio communications. According to one authority:
At first, the regulation of radio in the United States was
largely perfunctory. No great problems of interference arose,
since the number of frequencies was ample for the stations then
in existence. Regulations consisted merely of safeguarding established services from unlicensed operation, inspection of radio
apparatus, and checking the emission of radio stations to see
7
that they conformed to required standards.1
The advent of commercial broadcasting in 1921, however, brought
problems which were not contemplated when the 1912 Act was passed.
To accommodate broadcasting stations, the Secretary designated 360
meters and later 400 meters as suitable for broadcasting and licensed
all such stations to operate on these two channels. No attempt was made
to assign a separate channel to each station; rather, the wave lengths
were assigned to all in a group.' 8 The result was inevitable: "The group
policy of allocation to several hundred stations attempting to operate
simultaneously on two frequencies resulted in intolerable interference to
the detriment of the listening public."' 9
for Federal Government use in both the Berlin and London conventions. Other regulations
prescribed the use of "pure," "sharp," and "standard distress" waves, and authorized by
implication amateur operation below 200 meters. Other sections of the Act made willful
interference by a radio operator a misdemeanor (section 5), defined radio communication
(section 6), and prohibited the transmission of fraudulent distress signals (section 7). See
WARNER, RADIO AND TELEvIsIoN LAW 757-62

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

(1953).

Regulation No. 1. See WARNER, ibid.
Ibid.
HERRING & GROSS, TELECOMMUNICATIONS 240 (1936).
DAvis, note 10, at 40.
WARNER, note 14, at 761-62.
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The problem of interference, furthermore, was not confined to private
broadcasting, but extended as well to the broadcasting activities of Federal Government agencies within the bands reserved for their use by
the 1912 Act. Without even licensing restrictions to prescribe wave
lengths for specific use, i.e., to divide up the Federal Government allocation among users, various government stations operated anywhere within
the bands reserved to government under the 1912 legislation. And, World
War I had accentuated the problem by increasing Federal Governmental
radio activity.2 °
The Secretary of Commerce moved to combat the chaotic condition,
albeit by separate means in the Federal Government and civilian spheres.
Thus, organization of radio-frequency assignment procedures respecting
broadcasting activities of Federal Government agencies was sought in the
creation, on June 1, 1922, of the Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee (IRAC). Inasmuch as the Secretary at that time had the duty of
administering the Marine Navigation Laws, the Wireless Ship Acts and
the Radio Act of 1912, it was natural that he should take the lead in
forming IRAC. The Committee, which was composed of representatives
of the various federal agencies engaged in broadcasting, was established
to coordinate Federal Government broadcasting so as to minimize interference and make more effective use of shared time. To this end, frequencies within the Federal Government allocation were assigned through a
procedure of cooperation and agreement by the users. Institutionalization
of this procedure was achieved in IRAC's adoption of a statement of
policy on May 8, 1925,21 many of the statements of which appear as applicable today as when written.
Although the "cooperative procedure for assigning radio frequencies
to [Federal] Government stations was proceeding smoothly, the licensing
of non-Government [civilian] stations became a more serious problem
as time went on. . ," In the private area, the Secretary of Commerce
sought to ameliorate the interference problem by utilizing his licensing
powers under the 1912 Act. In this regard, the Secretary had called conferences of the various radio interests in Washington in February, 1922,
and March, 1923, ' in which it was agreed by the participants that the
Secretary should have the authority to assign frequencies, to divide time
and to limit power of the transmitters. As noted above, this authority was
not specifically granted in the 1912 Act. Senator White introduced a
radio bill in the Senate which would have accorded the authority to assign frequencies, but it failed to receive Congressional approbation in
20. MAcQuivEY, note 13, at 61.
21. Statement of Government Domestic Radio Policy, Adopted by the Interdepartment
Radio Advisory Committee (mimeo 28485 of IRAC, May 8, 1925).
22. MAcQuvEY, note 13 at 63-64.
23. See HERRING & GROSS, note 17 at 242.
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1922.24 As the situation became more serious, radio conferences were
again called in October, 1924, and in the autumn of 1925. At the latter
conference, it was recommended that no new licenses be issued.25
In the face of such necessity, the Secretary sought to utilize the licensing power as a vehicle for frequency assignment. That such use was
authorized under the Act was, to say the least, questionable. An opinion
of the Attorney General in 1912 had stated:
The language of the act, the nature of the subject-matter
regulated, as well as the general scope of the statute, negative
the idea that Congress intended to repose any such discretion
in you [the Secretary] in the matter of licenses. It is apparent
from the act as a whole that Congress determined thereby to put
the subject of radio communication under Federal supervision
so far as it was interstate or foreign in its nature. It is also apparent therefrom that the supervision and control is taken by
Congress upon itself, and that the Secretary of Commerce and
Labor is only authorized to deal with the matter as provided in
the act and is given no general regulative power in respect thereto. The act prescribes the conditions under which the licenses
shall operate, containing a set of regulations, with penalties for
their violation.2 6
On the other hand, a decision of the Court of Appeals of the District
of Columbia in 1923, in the Intercity case,27 concluded that the Secretary
did possess such power. This set the stage for United States v. Zenith
28
Radio Corporation
in 1926. Zenith in its license had been assigned a
specific wave length with hours of operation limited from 10 to 12 p.m.
on Thursday night and then only "when the use of this period is not
desired by the General Electric Company's Denver station." The government brought criminal proceedings under section 1 of the Radio Act of
1912 since Zenith admitted that it had operated at a frequency and during
hours not permitted in the license. The court, in finding for the defendants, held that the Secretary of Commerce had no authority under the
Act to deny a license to a qualified applicant or even to apply restrictions
as to hours or frequencies to be used.
The conflict between Intercity and Zenith became the occasion of
another request by the Secretary to the Attorney General for a definition
of his powers under the 1912 Act. The opinion of the Attorney General
24. See MAcQUWvEY, note 13 at 62.
25. Id. at 63.
26. 29 Op. A.G. 579 (1912).
27. Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co., Inc., 286 F.2d 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
28. United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F.2d 614 (D.C. Il. 1926).
Carmichael v. Anderson, 14 F.2d 166 (D.C.W.D. Mo. 1926).

See

also
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concluded that while a station could not operate without a license, the
Secretary had no discretion to refuse a license upon proper application.
It further concluded that no power was conferred by the Act to designate
the frequency within the broadcast band at which a station might operate,
and that the Secretary might fix the normal wave length but the station
was free to select other frequencies for operation? 9
As a result of this opinion, the Secretary ceased assigning wave lengths,
his office merely registering the frequencies designated by applicants who'
were free to use whatever frequency they chose.30 With the Secretary
exercising merely a registration or ministerial function, the 1912 Act
"broke down." As observed by one authority:
During the period from July, 1926 to Feb. 23, 1927, when
Congress enacted a new law to regulate radio communication,
,nearly 200 new broadcasting stations came into existence bringing the total up to 733. The new stations selected whatever frequencies they chose and operated them with any desired power
regardless of the interference that they happened to create for
existing American or Canadian Stations. Existing stations that
were dissatisfied with their assignments jumped to other frequencies and increased power and hours of operation at will.
The result was a chaos in broadcasting which has properly been
termed a "breakdown of the law."31
And, by another:
It is not, therefore, entirely accurate to say that the 1912 law
broke 'down.' It had merely been prepared on a theory of licensing which was inconsistent with all the developments of the
art. The developments require a selection in certain classes from
among the applicants for radio licenses because there is not
room for all. The Act of 1912 contemplated only that state of
the communication technique which prevailed in the mobile,
amateur, and experimental frequencies where the nature of the
activity was such that all who desired might be licensed. 2
Whichever of the above analyses is accepted, it is clear that increased
demands upon a limited natural resource had made the 1912 Act obsolete.
Assignment of frequencies within the civilian sphere had become imperative if the chaos of increasing interference was to be checked. Bills to
amend the 1912 Act, beginning in 1915, and spurred by the radio conferences of the 1920's, thus were introduced into the Congress with
increasing frequency."
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

35 Op. A.G. 126 (1926).
MAcQUIVEY, note 13 at 64.
HErRING & GROSS, note 17 at 244.
DAvis, note 10 at 45, 54.
For an analysis of these bills, see WARNER, note 14 at 766-776.
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B.

1927-1933

Finally, as a result of President Coolidge's plea for legislative action
in his message of December 7, 1926,84 a stop-gap measure was passed in
the form of a joint resolution limiting licenses to a 90-day period. The
licenses were not to be renewed unless the applicant would state in writing "a waiver of any right or any claim to any right, as against the United
States, to any wave length or to the use of the other in radio transmission
because of a previous license to use the same or because of the use
thereof."8 5
This temporary Act was succeeded, on February 23, 1927, by the
Radio Act of 1927." Section 3 of the 1927 Act created the Federal Radio
Commission (the forebear of the Federal Communications Commission),
and (in section 4) conferred upon it the power to classify stations; assign
frequencies; determine the amount of power, the time of station operation, and location of stations; prescribe areas or zones to be served by
any station; regulate the external effects of apparatus used; and "make
such regulations not inconsistent with law as it may deem necessary to
prevent interference between stations and to carry out the provisions of
this Act." The Commission was to perform those functions when the
"public convenience, interest, or necessity requires."
Thus, the Radio Act of 1927 "was a traffic-control measure designed
primarily to prevent interference between stations in order that the public
receive adequate broadcast service." 7 Congress did not, however, spell
out how the Commission was to implement this policy, other than through
application of the general standard of "public convenience, interest, or
necessity." Through the provisions of section 4, however, and the discretionary licensing powers of sections 3, and 9-14, statutory authority had
been created by which some order might be brought to civilian broadcasting. This was the area in which the 1912 Act had been deficient, and
this was the deficiency which the 1927 Act sought to rectify.
Significantly, the 1927 Act accorded licensing and assignment functions to the Commission only with regard to non-Federal Government
[civilian] users. Section 6 is noteworthy in this regard, particularly in
view of the fact that it constitutes the basis of sections 305 and 606 of
the present (1934) legislation. The section reads:
Radio stations belonging to and operated by the United States.
shall not be subject to the provisions of Sections 1, 4, and 5 of
this Act. All such [Federal] government stations shall use such
frequencies or wave lengths as shall be assigned to each or to
34. Id. at 775-76, n.63.
35. 44 STAT. 917.
36. 44 STAT. 1162-74.
37. WARNER, note 14 at 777.
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each class by the President. All such stations, except stations
on board naval and other government vessels while at sea or beyond the limits of the continental United States, when transmitting any radio communication or signal other than a communication or signal relating to government business shall conform
to such rules and regulations designed to prevent interference
with other radio stations and the rights of others as the licensing
authority may prescribe. Upon proclamation by the President
that there exists war or a threat of war or a state of public peril
or disaster or other national emergency, or in order to preserve
the neutrality of the United States, the President may suspend
or amend, for such time as he may see fit, the rules and regulations applicable to any or all stations within the jurisdiction of
the United States as prescribed by the licensing authority, and
may cause the closing of any station for radio communication
and the removal therefrom of its apparatus and equipment, or
he may authorize the use or control of any such station and/or
its apparatus and equipment by any department of the government under such regulations as he may prescribe, upon just
compensation to the owners. Radio stations on board vessels
of the United States Shipping Board or the United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation or the Inland and
Coastwise Waterways Service shall be subject to the provisions
of this Act."8
It should be recalled that IRAC had now been in existence for some
five years. It had been considering frequency allocation problems within
the Federal Government sphere since two months after its creation, and
by now had fairly well institutionalized its procedures for assignment 9
It was little wonder, then, that the President, who had neither the time
nor the expertise personally to effectuate section 6 of the 1927 Act,
should have made use of this body. Accordingly, on March 29, 1927,
President Coolidge wrote to the Secretary of Commerce stating that,
concerning the performance of his duties under section 6 (involving the
assignment of frequencies to Federal Government stations and the avoidance of conflicts between various Federal Government services), he
wished to have applications from Federal Government agencies for use
of frequencies submitted to IRAC, which should make recommendations
advising him in such matters.4
The 1.927 Act, however, did not cure the allocation problem in the
civilian sphere overnight. To begin with, the Act had provided that the
38.
and 68
39.
40.

For a discussion of this provision see 67 Cong. Rec. 5480, 5583, 12357, 12505, 12616;
Cong. Rec. 2563, 2578, 2589, 2876, 2877, 3121, 4153.
Hearings, note 2 at 130-31.
Id. at 130.

1965-1966]

RADIO FREQUENCY ALLOCATION

Commission was to be appointed on a year-to-year basis.4" To make
matters worse, Congress failed to pass the deficiency appropriation bill
of 1927 with the result that the Commission had no staff to assist it in
administering the Act, and the Senate confirmed only three of the commissioners that year. At the end of the first year, four members functioned as the Commission, only one of whom had been confirmed. This
lack of personnel and appropriations thus precluded the Commission
from accomplishing anything in the first year, other than eliminating
conclusion
the worst cases of radio interference.42 Professor Cushman's
' 43
is inescapable: the Commission "got off to a bad start.
In 1928, the Act was supplemented by the so-called Davis Amendment.44 Among the provisions of the 1927 Act had been the authority to
establish areas or zones to be served by any station. No provision had
been made, however, for the equalization of broadcasting service. The
Amendment sought to rectify this deficiency by requiring an equality
of radio facilities among geographical zones according to population and
among states within each zone according to population. 45 Accordingly,
the Commission in 1928 promulgated and put into effect a tripartite
allocation plan which provided for local, regional and clear channel stations. The Amendment was implemented by a quota system wherein
zones and states received quotas or percentages of broadcast facilities
based upon population.4 6
Difficult problems of interpretation, however, beset the attempt to
apply the Davis Amendment in particular situations. The inevitable litigation which followed culminated in FederalRadio Commission v. Nelson
Bros. Co.,47 wherein the Supreme Court upheld the right of Congress
under the commerce clause to regulate radio communication, thus upholding the constitutionality of the Radio Act of 1927, and of the Davis
Amendment. In addition, the Court commented on the interpretation of
the phrase "public interest, convenience or necessity," indicating that
it "is to be interpreted by its context, by the nature of radio transmission
and reception, by the scope, character and quality of services, and, where
an equitable adjustment between States is. in view, by the relative advantages in Service which will be enjoyed by the public through the
distribution of facilities.1 4 The case is particularly significant in that
41. This was changed in the 1929 Act, which provided that the powers and duties
vested in the Commission should continue "until otherwise provided by law."
42. See First Annual Report of. the Radio Commission 1-2 (1927).
43. CusmiAN, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY CoImIissIoNs 311 (1941).
44. 45 STAT. 373. The Davis Amendment was repealed by Act of Congress, June 5, 1936.
45. See WARNER, note 14 at 780, n.78.
46. See Second Annual Report of the Radio Commission 17 (1928).
47. 62 Fed. 854 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd, 289 U.S. 266 (1933).
48. 289 U.S. at 285.
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the language of the 1927 Act, which was upheld against constitutional
attack, is the language which appears in the present (1934) legislation.
It is noteworthy that although the Act accorded broad discretion to
the Commission in allocation management in the civilian sphere, i.e.,
through the "public interest, convenience or necessity" standard, the
Commission at a very early date began to develop principles and rules
upon the basis of which assignment decisions would be made. To some
extent, then, these decisions were in a range of predictability. These
principles have been summarized as follows:
One of the basic principles was that there should be established
the best possible reception conditions throughout the entire
country. A second principle was that the interests of the listening public are superior to those of the broadcasters. A third
general principle was that the standard of public interest, convenience and necessity must be applied as a comparative rather
than as an absolute standard. In the case of two applicants for a
frequency, it is incumbent upon the Commission to choose the
best of the two, not necessarily to compare them against an absolute standard, although the Commission has certain minimum
standards that broadcasters must meet.49
These basic principles were formalized in the promulgation of a set
of rules, which resulted from hearings held by the Commission in 1928.0
These rules contain many of the basic concepts of radio-frequency management in the civilian sphere employed in the present rules of the Federal Communications Commission.
C. The 1934 Act
Radio communication, however, was growing rapidly. Rapid growth
brought new problems and the latter brought new bills and proposed
amendments to the 1927 Act.51 Finally, in 1933, President Roosevelt
requested the Secretary of Commerce to establish an interdepartmental
committee to undertake a thorough study of the whole problem of the
regulation of communications. The committee's report, submitted on January 23, 1934, identified the crucial problem as one of coordination of
the various communication control bodies and suggested a single agency
as a solution. The President sent the committee report to Congress accompanied by the following message:
I have long felt that for the sake of clarity and effectiveness, the relationship of the Federal Government to certain
services known as utilities should be divided into three fields:
49. MAcQtLvEy, note 13 at 68-69.
50. See Engineering Memorandum of May 14, 1928, cited in MACQUrVEY, note 13 at 69.
51. See WARNER, note 14 at 783-88, for the history of these bills.
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Transportation, power, and communications. The problems of
transportation are vested in the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the problems of power, its development, transmission,
and distribution, in the Federal Power Commission.
In the field of communications, however, there is today no
single Government agency charged with broad authority.
The Congress has vested certain authority over certain forms
of communications in the Insterstate Commerce Commission,
and there is in addition the agency known as the Federal Radio
Commission.
I recommend that the Congress create a new agency to
be known as the Federal Communications Commission, such
agency to be vested with the authority now lying in the Federal
Radio Commission and with such authority over communications as now lies with the Interstate Commerce Commissionthe services affected to be all of those which rely on wires,
cables, or radio as a medium of transmission.
It is my thought that a new commission such as I suggest
might well be organized this year by transferring the present
authority for the control of communications of the Radio Commission and the Interstate Commerce Commission. The new
body should, in addition, be given full power to investigate and
study the business of existing companies and make recommendations to the Congress for additional legislation at the next
session.
The result was the Communications Act of 1934, 53 providing for unified
control of all civilian communications facilities in a single body. It thus
abolished the Federal Radio Commission and transferred all of its duties,
powers and functions under the Radio Act of 1927 to a new seven member
commission, the Federal Communications Commission. Many new provisions appear in the 1934 Act, particularly those dealing with the procedures and methods of regulating utility companies. However, with respect to the assignment and control of frequencies, the substance of the
1927 legislation was re-enacted.5 4 Thus, the relevant sections of the 1927
Act, i.e., sections 4, 5 and 6, have become, with minor additions and
alterations, sections 301, 303, 305 and 606 of the 1934 Act.
Sections 301 and 303, in re-enacting sections 4 and 5 of the 1927 Act,
afford the basis of FCC licensing and assignment procedures with respect
52. S. Doc. 144, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
53. 48 STAT. 1064.
54. H.R. No. 1918, 73 Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1934).
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to civilian users."5 Sections 305 and 606 are addressed to Federal Government stations. Section 305 exempts [Federal] Government stations from
the applicability of sections 301 and 303, and confers upon the President
the responsibility for assignment within this sphere (the first part of old
section 6). Section 606 relates to the emergency and war powers of the
President over telecommunications (the second part of old section 6,
dating back to the Act of 1912).
As a practical matter, of course, President Roosevelt was no more
equipped personally to administer section 305 than President Coolidge
had been to administer section 6 of the 1927 Act. Thus, IRAC continued,
under the new law, to handle frequency assignment problems of Federal
Government users.5 6 The only change made by President Roosevelt in
this period is reflected in his letter to the Chairman of the FCC, of November 9, 1935, suggesting that IRAC continue to function as a clearing
house in the detailed allocation of specific frequencies, but that its reports
and draft Executive Orders be submitted through the Chairman of the
FCC.

57

D. The War Years
On September 20, 1940, the President, by Executive Order 8546,
created the Defense Communications Board (DCB) to coordinate the
relationship of all branches of communication to national defense.5" By
Executive Order 9183 of January 15, 1942, the name was changed to
the Board of War Communications (BWC), but the functions and operations remained fundamentally the same. The Board was composed of
the Chairman of the FCC, the Chief Signal Officer of the Army, the
Director of Naval Communications, the Assistant Secretary of State in
charge of the Division of International Communications, and the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury in charge of the Coast Guard. 9
The concern of the Board was with national defense. The President's
authority under section 606 was delegated to the Board. Pursuant thereto,
the Board conducted studies of available communications facilities and
controlled their reallocation in accordance with the needs of defense and
of the war. The Board did not, however, concern itself with standards of
frequency assignment or administrative problems of reallocating frequencies as such, either within the Federal Government or civilian
55. These procedures will be considered in detail in Part II of this study.
56. MACQUrVEY, note 13 at 72.

57. Hearings, note 2 at 131.
58. Ibid.
59. The Board functioned through seventeen committees, the membership of which
included representatives of all the communications industry and of the agencies of the
Federal Government concerned with communications. State and Municipal government
representatives were also included, as was IRAC once the War had commenced. See
MACQUIVEY, note 13 at 72-73.
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spheres, or between them. Those problems continued to be handled by
IRAC and the FCC.60
World War II, as had World War I before it, brought increasing
problems of frequency saturation and of organizational coordination.
The problems now were intensified, however, as technological development had inundated available spectrum space. Congressional investigations and various studies were a response to this pressure. The select
committee created by Resolution 21, 78th Congress, to investigate the
FCC was an example. In those hearings in 1943, FCC Commissioner
Craven recommended that (1) Congress "clarify" jurisdiction over the
radio spectrum, (2) in the process "legalize" IRAC, and (3) that the
President adjudicate FCC/IRAC differences, taking into account the
advice of an advisory board. The Committee Chairman was of the view,
however, that Congress could not make the President accept advice, and
Senator White believed that the military services would not accept unified
control over the radio spectrum, even to the extent recommended by
Commissioner Craven. 61
In these 1943 hearings there were contained the kernels of much of the
controversy respecting spectrum allocation which has continued down to
date. How were defense and non-defense communication needs to be
harmonized in regard to a limited resource, i.e., the radio spectrum, where
there was no institutionalized coordination of assignments of various
parts of that resource? That conflicts between the FCC and IRAC in
this regard were beginning to constitute a problem is apparent from
these hearings.
Both IRAC and the FCC were planning for post-war frequency allocation problems. The FCC Hearings in Docket 6651, ordered August 15,
1944, are illustrative. As a result of this hearing, new FCC tables were
issued on May 25 and June 27, 1945. An IRAC report, which included
an exhaustive study of technical advances in electronic equipment and
techniques in World War II, submitted to the Department of State in
June of 1944, and altered to incorporate the findings of Docket 6651,
June 27, 1945, became the basis for the U.S. position at the Atlantic
City Radio Conference of 1947.62
60. Id. at 73.
61. Hearings, note 2 at 131.
62. Ibid. Mention may be made of the special committee on communication, set up
on June 21, 1943, to undertake planning with respect to the problems of transfer from war
to peace. The committee was created by the Secretary of State, and included representatives
from all the principal agencies concerned with communications. Members of Congress were
also invited to participate in its deliberations. Though primarily concerned with international agreements, operating arrangements, restraints of trade, etc., the technical subcommittee did undertake some studies with respect to changing the allocation table of radio
frequencies in the Cairo Radio Regulations of 1938. Particularly troublesome in this regard
was the problem of considering and attempting to reconcile the conflicting views of the
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E. The Post-War Period
On March 14, 1946, the Telecommunications Coordinating Committee
(TCC) was organized under the sponsorship of the Department of State
by voluntary agreement of State, Treasury, War, Navy, Commerce, and
the FCC; later the Air Force was added. 8 "This agency was established
in the expectation that it could develop plans and programs and formulate
'6 4
policies to promote the most effective use of wire and radio facilities.
The objectives to be pursued by TCC were defined as follows:
...The coordination of policies of the various departments and
agencies of the United States Government relating to domestic
and international communications matters in order to encourage
the most efficient system for international communication by
wire and radio; promote the national defense and security;
develop the most effective use of wire and radio facilities as
an instrument for the expansion of foreign trade; provide the
most efficient and economical system for handling wire and
radio communications of the various departments and agencies
of the United States Government; and advise on problems of
an international nature including preparation for international
telecommunications conferences. The Committee shall act in
an advisory capacity only, but may take final action when specifically authorized by unanimous concurrence of all government
agencies represented by the membership. The Committee shall
maintain close liaison with the Cryptographic Security Board,
the Air Coordinating Committee and the United States Central
Intelligence Agency. In accordance with the foregoing, the primary objective of this Committee is the formulation of a national communications policy."8

Problems in achieving the desired coordination between civilian and
Federal Government use and between the agencies within the Federal
Government sphere, however, beset TCC from the outset. The FCC
pointed to its own statutory responsibilities for policy formulation and
advice to Congress. The state reiterated its initial view that the TCC
could work only by unanimity and that there must be no intrusions on
responsibilities of individual agencies. The result was inevitable: "As a
result, although it has a long history of trying to establish itself as a
mechanism for the formulation of national policy, it has proved to be
Civil Aeronautics Administration and others concerning the amount of spectrum space
to be allocated for aeronautical radio. The Committee was replaced after the war by the
Telecommunications Coordinating Committee (TCC). See MACQUIVEY, note 13 at .74-77.
63. Report, note 1 at 17.
64. Ibid.
65. Memorandum from Mr. Offerman, State Department, to Mrs. Hesse, Department
of Commerce, April 9, 1946, cited in MAcQurJvY, note 13 at 78-79.
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ineffectual and today is advisory only to State."6 TCC, however, at least,
considered and dealt with a number of important subjects, and may
even have contributed in some measure to progress toward their solution. 7
The year 1946 was significant, also, for the Seidman and Moore
study,68 under the auspices of the Bureau of the Budget. The study was
designed to determine the organization required to carry out the President's responsibility for assigning radio frequencies to Federal Government stations. It recommended an Executive Order establishing an office
of the Coordinator of Government Radio in the Executive Office of the
President. What was essentially contemplated was the result achieved
by Executive Order 10460, discussed hereafter.69
Finally, 1946 saw passage of the Administrative Procedure Act, approved on June 11 of that year.70 Its significance to allocation problems
is that in its application to the FCC, the creation of tables (rule-making)
and licensing of particular users (adjudication) are subject to a set of
standardized legal rules. Thus, in the civilian sphere, spectrum allocation
and the assignment of frequencies follow defined procedures including
66. Hearings, note 2 at 132.
67. These accomplishments have been summarized as follows:
The merger of international communications companies;
Preparations for the Moscow Telecommunications Conference at Moscow,
U.S.S.R. in 1946;
Standardization of radio aids to navigation, particularly air navigation;
Use of radio by the United Nations at its headquarters in New York and the
problem of coordinating the use of radio frequencies for that operation;
The use of submarine cables, particularly those which had been involved in
war activities;
Establishment of overseas relay points for radio circuits, such as those in the
Philippines and in the Tangier International Zone;
The establishment of direct circuits between the United States and certain
foreign countries;
Liaison with other intra-Government and Government-Industry committees,
such as the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics, Radio Technical Commission for Marine Services, the IRAC, the National Security Council and the
Joint Aviation-Telecommunications Coordinating Committee. See MACQUVEY,
note 13 at 79-80.
68. SErmArN & MooRE, BUDGET BUREAU STUDY (1946).
69. The report emphasized some basic points, two of which were:
(1) The FCC operates as a defender of non-Government [civilian] interest in
working with the IRAC. If charged with making all frequency assignments it
would be subject to much greater political pressure and to accusations from both
sides. In turn, its regulation of private radio would be made difficult.
(2) It has been proved amply that executive agencies will not allow a co-equal
agency to control their internal operations. It stated . . . on a proposal to create
a Department of Communications . . . the regulation of one department by another
generally has been quite unsuccessful. Quoted in Hearings, note 2 at 132.
70. 60 STAT. 237.
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notice, the opportunity to participate, public hearings, etc.7 Notably,
the Act makes certain exceptions, e.g., "except to the extent that there
is involved (1) any military, naval, or foreign affairs function of the
United States .. .7' The significance of this exception to the separate
treatment of civilian and Federal Government users is manifest. In effect,
the situation concerning Federal Government use of the spectrum established prior to, and confirmed in one 1934 Act, was continued unchanged
in the 1946 Administrative Procedure Act.
On February 24, 1947, Executive Order 9831 abolished the Board of
War Communications.
Between January 15, 1948 and February 28, 1950, the Provisional
Frequency Board (PFB) of the International Telecommunications Union
met at Geneva to draft a frequency list for all frequency uses between 4
and 27.5 megacycles. "It failed because the demand for frequencies far
exceeded the supply and countries, including the United States, could not
or would not reduce their demands."73
On February 3, 1949, Senator Johnson of Colorado introduced Senate
Resolution 50, 81st Congress, which as adopted directed the Senate
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, to investigate communications problems. The investigation was to include, inter alia, the
following:
(a) the problems relating to U.S. common carriers in domestic
and international operations, including relationship of problems
to national security; (b) the problems presented by requirements of international treaties and conventions re necessary
revisions of Communications Act; (c) the problems arising
from the unprecedented demands for frequencies for nonCongress
Government [civilian] users; and policies which
74
should adopt for the granting of such allocations.
The FCC, IRAC, and the various federal agencies involved in radio
broadcasting all submitted reports on their respective radio frequency
usage and wire operations during the course of this investigation. Senator
Johnson, subsequently (April 24, 1951) introduced a bill, S. 1378, to
assign to the FCC the function of allocating frequencies to Federal Government as well as to civilian stations. The bill failed of enactment and,
in consequence, the 1949 Senate activity in the allocation area produced
no results.
Technological advances and the increasing defense requisites occa71.
72.
73.
74.

Administrative Procedure Act,
Id. at 34.
Hearings, note 2 at 132.
Id. at 132-33.
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sioned by the Korean War heightened the competition for available
spectrum space. In fact, even before the outbreak of hostilities, the need
for cooperation or coordination between Federal Government and civilian allocation was evidenced in H. R. 6949, introduced on January 24,
1950, by Representative Sadowski. The bill proposed the creation of an
independent agency within the executive branch, to be called the Frequency Control Board. The five-man Board was to formulate plans and
policies for spectrum allocation, assign frequencies to Federal Government stations and prescribe regulations for FCC assignment to civilian
users. It would also possess the powers to disapprove FCC spectrum
assignments which would interfere with proper Federal government uses.
A military liaison committee was to advise the Board, and by virtue of
right of appeal to the President through the Secretary of Defense, the
committee, in matters of national defense, was to possess a virtual veto
power over the Board. Strong opposition, both within and without govern75
ment, killed the bill.

The failure of the Provisional Frequency Board of the ITU, however,
to develop an agreed engineering plan for international frequency assignments,7 6 alluded to earlier, and the increasing competition between Fed77
eral Government and civilian users for high frequencies domestically,
prompted the FCC, in a letter dated May 20, 1949, to request that the
Department of State give consideration to the establishment of some
mechanisms for making policy decisions on the use of radio frequencies
by Federal Government agencies. 8 The Department, on July 28, 1949,
submitted a letter to President Truman suggesting that a commission
be set up to this end. The President agreed, and by Executive Ordei
10110, 7 ' dated February 17, 1950, established the President's Communi-

cations Policy Board (PCPB).
F. The President's Communications Policy Board
The objectives of the Board were revealed in the following excerpt from
the President's letter to the Board's Chairman, Dr. Irving Stewart:
Developments in this field during and since the war have
created a number of problems which require careful consideration at this time. The extent to which the Government should,
in time of peace, continue to operate its own communciations
facilities is one such problem of current importance. The question of merging the overseas operations of our commercial communications companies also requires objective review. The most
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 133.
See MACQuivEY, note 13 at 82.
Report, note 1 at 77.
MACQUIwY, note 13 at 82.
15 F.R. 909.
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pressing communications problem at this particular time, however, is the scarcity of radio frequencies in relation to the steadily growing demand. Increasing difficulty is being experienced
in meeting the demand for frequencies domestically, and even
greater difficulty is encountered internationally in attempting
to agree upon the allocation of available frequencies among the
nations of the world. In the face of this growing shortage, the
problem of assuring an equitable distribution of the available
supply of frequencies among all claimants, both governmental
[Federal] and private [civilian], is rapidly assuming major
prominence. °
The Executive Order setting up the PCPB directed that body to study
the present and potential use o f frequency space by both Federal Government and civilian users and to make recommendations to the President
with respect to the "most effective use of radio frequencies by [Federal]
governmental and non-governmental [civilian] users and alternative administrative arrangements in the Federal Government for the sound
effectuation of such policies. ..2,8

After 59 sessions and a year of work, the Board, on February 16, 1951,
submitted its 238 page report. Five issues were identified for study, the
most significant of which for present purposes was the first. This involved
the question of how the United States should formulate "policies and plans
for guidance in reconciling the conflicting interests and needs of [Federal] Government and private [civilian] users of spectrum space---that
is, for,8 guidance
in making the best use of its share of the total spec2
trum. )
Parenthetically it should be noted that during the course of its study,
the Board considered and rejected two proposed solutions to the allocation
problem: "(a) the establishment of a superboard to allocate the spectrum
space to the FCC and to [Federal] Government agencies, and (b) the
assignment to the FCC of responsibility for the allocation of frequencies
to [Federal] Government agencies-the latter was concurred in by the
FCC." Rejection of the latter proposal, however, did not dissuade
Senator Johnson from introducing Bill S. 1378, on April 24, 1951, to
amend section 305(a) of the 1934 Act to provide for FCC assignment of
frequencies to Federal Government stations. As noted earlier, the bill
failed to pass. 4
80. President's Communications Policy Board, Telecommunications, A Program for
Progress 1 (1951).
81. 15 F.R. 909.
82. Hearings, note 2 at 133.
83. Id. at 134.
84. Note 95, and accompanying text.
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Two conclusions of the Board are pertinent:
(1) As to the pressures on the radio spectrum: "The resolution of these problems can be secured only through adequate,
energetic management, which demands that the Government
organize itself to take a comprehensive view of the telecommunication field."
(2) As to Government organization: "Fundamental changes
in telecommunications requires overhaul of Government machinery for formulating telecommunications policy and for administering certain telecommunications activities in the national
interest"; and "The whole Government telecommunications
structure is an uncoordinated one and will be even less adequate in the future than it has been in the past to meet the evergrowing complexities of telecommunications. A new agency is
needed to give coherence to the structure. 8 5
The Board made five recommendations,"6 principal among which was
the creation of a Telecommunications Advisory Board to advise and
assist the President in carrying out his responsibilities in telecommunications. In addition to planning and guidance functions generally,, the
85. Hearings, note 2 at 134.
86. These were [Hearings, note 2 at 134]:
(1) There be established in the Executive Office of the President a three-man
Telecommunications Advisory Board-or as a minimum a single telecommunications"
adviser to the President-to advise and assist the President in the execution of
his responsibilities in telecommunication. This Board should carry out the planning and executive functions required by the President's powers to assign frequencies
to [Federal] Government users, and to exercise control over the Nation's telecommunication facilities during a national emergency or war. It should stimulate
and correlate the formulation of plans and policies to insure maximum contribution
of telecommunication to the national interest, and maximum effectiveness of U.S.
participation in international negotiations. The Board should recommend necessary
legislation to the President, and advise him on legislation. The Board should stimulate research on problems in telecommunication. It should establish and monitor a
system of initial justification and continued use of frequencies by [Federal]
Government agencies, and, in cooperation with the FCC, supervise the division
of spectrum space between [Federal] Government and non-Government [civilian]
users.
(2) The FCC should be strengthened in funds and organizational structure
so that it can better carry out its duties, and can participate more fully in
government wide formulation of policy.
(3) Appropriate units within the Department of State should be strengthened
for better performance of functions in telecommunication.
(4) Other Government agencies should strengthen their machinery for formulating telecommunication policy, and for relating that policy to the other policies
and programs served by telecommunications.
(5) The Government should step up its program for conducting and stimulating research in telecommunication, especially in those fields bearing on propagation and frequency utilization.
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Board was to establish and monitor a system of initial justification and
continued use of frequencies by Federal Government agencies, and, in
cooperation with the FCC, supervise the division of spectrum space between Federal Government and civilian users.
More significant for present purposes than its conclusions and recommendations, however, was the Board's consideration of the management
requisites of so important, yet limited, a natural resource. As the Board
stated:
In the exploitation of a limited entity such as the radio spectrum, it is essential that as the pressure for radio channels
increases there must be established alert telecommunications
management to assure equitable allocation of these channels.
Further, it is essential that this managemen*t assure, insofar as
is economically practicable, the use of the technical improvements in equipment and operating techniques for increasing the
intelligence transmitted per kilocycle of spectrum space. 7
The objective having been stated, the Board turned to the question
posed thereby, i.e., the effectiveness of government management in allocating frequencies and supervising spectrum usage. In this connection, the
Board was highly critical of the bifurcated organizational structures in
the 1934 Act, the Act having been written before demand for spectrum
space had become acute, and "passed at a time when there was far less
conflict than there is now between the requirements of the government
and the requirements of other claimants for radio frequencies."" Whereas the Act had reposed in the FCC responsibility for all civilian communications, section 305 had given the President the power to assign
frequencies to government stations and had exempted the latter from
the licensing and regulatory powers of the FCC, and section 606 had
authorized the President to assume control of all telecommunications in
times of war and emergency. Moreover, though elaborate procedures
and standards for assignment had been worked out by statute and rule
respecting FCC management of civilian usage, no standards were established at all for assignment to Federal Government users.
In addition, "the Act places the Commission under no duty to respect
the President's assignment; either the Commission or the President
could start a radio war by assigning a frequency already in use to an
interfering user.""9 The absence of such war was attributed to FCC
subservience to IRAC decisions. The significance of this is that "allocations were made by officials who could not weigh all demands for spec87. President's Communications Policy Board, note 80 at 9.
88. Id. at 194.
89. Id. at 193-94.
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trum space, [federal] government and private [civilian], and judge them
impartially on the basis of full explanation. according to a single set of
standards and well-considered policy."9
The Board was especially critical of IRAC: "The key to the matter
is the nature of the group-'a group of users, rather than an independent
judging body.... [N]o body of users acting as a judge of its own requirements can take an impartial view of the requests of its members."'" Not
just its composition, but its procedures, as well, were criticized: "IRAC
does not require sufficient justification for the assignment of frequencies,
has no' authority to question any [federal] government department's
statement of need for a frequency, and is not constituted to do so. ' *2 A
third criticism involved the fact that there were no provisions for the
transfer of frequencies when the original assignees failed to utilize them.
Finally, the Board criticized the absence of any coherent policy of
spectrum allocation for the future. The Board stated:
[T]here has been no long-range study of the question, no longrange planning. No agency of government is in a position to
take a comprehensive view of this problem. No agency is qualified to advise the President in fields where the interests of
private [civilian] and [Federal] government telecommunications users are in conflict. Meanwhile in the absence of guiding
policy, the action of government agencies could seriously handicap the industry."
On the basis of the above, the Board's conclusions appear inescapable.
Thus:
[D]ual control [by IRAC and FCC] has led to friction, misunderstanding, waste, and avoidance of responsibility. The
organization is lacking in over-all policy guidance, and is so
complex that few persons understand all its ramifications. ...
The present telecommunications legislation and organization
have failed to produce adequate direction, leadership, administration, and control and have fostered dissension between the
federal government and industry. Many of these shortcomings
could have been mitigated if not avoided. ...
Exploitation of the spectrum is not static but is fluid, increasing
with the cooperation and good will of users, improvements in
equipment, operating techniques, circuit discipline, need, and
willingness to accept a poorer grade of service when necessary.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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at
at
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200.
30.
11.
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It is not likely that the improvements derived from these measures will keep pace with the demands unless energetic steps
are taken to establish an agency competent to assure the best
circuit discipline, equitable allocation of frequency channels,
and full use of technical developments....94
G. The Early 1950's
The President did not accept the Board's recommendation for establishing a Telecommunications Advisory Board, but instead, issued, on
October 9, 1951, Executive Order 10297. 95 Pursuant thereto a single
Telecommunications Advisor to the President (TAP.) was appointed
to assist and advise the President with respect to his- telecommunications
functions and to direct the activities of IRAC. Although possessing a
very small staff, Mr. Hardin Pratt, who was appointed to the job, was
quite active during the short life of TAP. Committees were formed consisting of representatives of Federal Government agencies concerned
with broadcasting. The principal committees were the Technical Policy
Steering Committee and an Executive Coordinating Committee. On October 6, 1952, the TAP reorganized the committee structure so as to combine the Executive Coordinating Committee and the IRAC into a new
committee which, though retaining the name IRAC, was to concern itself
primarily with policy matters relating to frequency usage. The FCC
withdrew as a regular member and, in lieu thereof, designated a liaison
representative to enable the commission to work jointly with the IRAC
in solution of mutual problems. A Frequency Assignment Subcommittee
(FAS) was established to take over the frequency assignment functions
of the old IRAC. Finally, the Telecommunications Planning Committee
(TPC) was set up on May 12, 1952, to deal with mobilization problems. 6
It was composed of the senior communications officials of the government.
On December 10, 1951, the President, pursuant to section 606 (c) of the
1934 Act, issued Executive Order 10312, providing for emergency control
over certain Federal Government and civilian stations (CONELRAD).
Responsibility for review of and concurrence in communications plans
was assigned to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board (later changed to Director, Office of
Defense Mobilization, and still later, July 1, 1958, to Director of Office
of Civil and Defense Mobilization)."
Organizational changes occurred soon after the new administration
came to power. Thus, the Office of Telecommunications Advisor was
transferred to the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) by Executive
94. Id. at 46, 50.
95. 16 F.R. 10329.

96. MAcQuVrEY, note 13 at 90-91.
97. Hearings, note 2 at 135.
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Order 10460, June 16, 1953. The Telecommunications Advisor forthwith
resigned because "President Eisenhower decided to make his office subordinate to another."9 He was eventually replaced (November 15, 1953)
by the appointment of an Assistant Director for Telecommunications in
the ODM, to:
(a) coordinate the implementation of all actions in the field of.
telecommunication in the U.S. Government, and to report to
the National Security Council periodically with respect to progress in the implementation of policies approved by the NSA
in this area; and (b) take additional steps to improve the management and administration of the radio frequency spectrum,
with particular reference to problems created by the divided
responsibilities of the President and the FCC and by difficulties
of international coordination.9 9
ODM General Administrative Order IX-I, establishing the position of
Assistant Director for Telecommunications with the responsibilities as
enumerated in Executive Order 10460, was issued in pursuance of that
directive. The order also directed that IRAC report through the Assistant Director. Specifically, the Assistant Director was given the following
duties:
(a) Coordinating the development of telecommunications policies and standards applying to the Executive branch of the
government;
(b) Developing high standards governing telecommunications
management within the executive branch of the government;
(c) Coordinating the development by several agencies of the
executive branch of telecommunications plans and programs
designed to assure maximum security to the United States in
time of national emergency with a minimum interference to
continuing non-governmental [civilian] requirements;
(d) Assisting and advising the President with respect to the
assignment of radio frequencies to [federal] government
agencies under the provisions of section 305 of the Communications Act of 1954, as amended, and establishing policies and
procedures governing such assignments and their continued use;
(e) Developing U.S. government frequency requirements; and
(f) Approving plans relating to the control of electromagnetic
radiation (CONELRAD)*100
98. Report, note 1 at 78.
99. Hearings, note 2 at 136.
100. Note 80 at 18.
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On September 23, 1953, Defense Mobilization Order TX-I reestablished
the Telecommunications Planning Committee (TPC). The basic structure
of the Committee was described by a member as follows:
The TPC is primarily concerned with policy formulation questions and is assisted in its operation by three panels. One is concerned with review of existing facilities, systems and methods
and the preparation of inventories and plans for reallocation of
telecommunications facilities in event of emergency. Another is
concerned with new developments, new techniques and new
methods and means of telecommunications. The third panel has
been concerned with problems arising from the need to maintain vital communications despite all foreseeable measures to
disrupt them.' 01
During this period, of course, IRAC was the body responsible for
developing recommendations regarding frequency assignments to Federal
Government radio stations. Such recommendations were reported to the
Assistant Director for Telecommunications of the ODM. Draft executive
orders for assignment of frequencies were submitted to the President
through the ODM. Through the assistance of TPC Panel I, the ODM
engaged in extensive planning functions related to emergency matters
contemplated by section 606.102 The ODM Telecommunications structure
at this time was as follows :103
ODM TELECOMMUNICATIONS
ORGANIZATION
PRESIDENT

F

ASST. DIR. FOR TELEC.

TIRAC
PANEL I

PANEL II7

F PANEL III

F

The reconstitution of IRAC, both in 1952 and again in 1953, discussed
above, occasioned increased institutional activity in that body. On August
101. MACQUIVEY, note 13 at 92.
102. Id. at 93.
103. Id. at 97.
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21, 1953, the new IRAC by-laws were approved. In August, 1953, the
budget estimate for IRAC for fiscal 1954, included in the ODM budget
request, gave IRAC a consolidated budget for the first time. On October
1, 1953, all IRAC records, property, funds and personnel were consolidated at ODM. Previously, they had been scattered between the Department of Commerce and the FCC.
Notably, however, the institutional changes brought about in telecommunications by Exective Order 10460, and what followed it, did not
change the basic functioning of IRAC.'0 4 Though reporting to a different
body, IRAC was still charged with formulating and recommending "policies, plans, and actions in connection with the0 management
and usage
5
of radio frequencies by the U.S. Government."
On November 5, 1953, IRAC established a set of principles for the
assignment and use of radio frequencies by Federal Government agencies
in order to attempt to assure that requests were justified and that assignments were used and not hoarded, and on July 1, 1954, IRAC adopted a
monthly review and notification procedure respecting assignments no
longer needed by Federal Government agencies." °6
There were, of course, additional Congressional and agency attempts
during this period to meet the problems posed by the PCPB. For example,
on August 3, 1953, Bill H. R. 6819, introduced by Representative Wolverton, would have established a Telecommunications Policy Committee
to
(1) coordinate the development of telecommunication policies
and standards; (2) formulate plans and policies with respect
to the best possible utilization of the radio spectrum and communication media in promoting the interests of the United
States. Participating agencies were, initially to be the Departments of State, Defense and Commerce, and the FCC with
others to be added by the President.0 7
The bill failed of enactment.
Working relations between IRAC and the FCC, though described as
"cooperative,"'
proved less than satisfactory with respect to over-all
coordination of spectrum allocation in the public interest. As has been
indicated, the FCC is responsible for assignments to civilian users, and
IRAC, for Federal Government users. Cooperation is therefore necessary
in resolving the threshold question of which bands are allocated for as104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 91.
See Hearings, note 2 at 136.
Id. at 136-37.
Id. at 136.
MAcQuIvEY, note 13 at 96.
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signment to civilian use, and which to Federal Government use. As one
commentator observed, though the two agencies cooperate with respect
to many common problems, this "has not resulted in a reshuffle of the
distribution of frequency space between [Federal] Government and nonGovernment [civilian] users to any substantial extent."'10 9
Illustratively, on September 8, 1954, the ODM-IRAC undertook a
study of the FCC's request for reallocation of frequency band 162-170
megacycles for civilian land-mobile radio service use in the 50 largest
standard metropolitan areas and rural areas of the United States."' An
ODM reply letter, dated November 17, 1954, to the FCC outlined the
views of the government agencies, which were negative, and suggested
that a study embracing the U.S. table of frequency allocations from
27.5 to at least 400 megacycles should be undertaken no later than
July 1, 1955. There was no response by the FCC. After additional study,
the FCC staff suggested to IRAC an alternative interim proposal for reallocation of 4 megacycles of space in the seven largest areas. An IRAC
report of December 20, 1956, however, informed the FCC that IRAC
had recommended against the reallocation because it would preclude the
satisfaction of vital foreseeable requirements of the Federal Government
in the VHF spectrum. The IRAC recommended, instead, another review,
this time of the table above 30 megacycles. This ended the matter. The
FCC had made specific requests based upon particularized needs and had
received no relief and only the most general explanations therefor.
On October 26, 1954, Executive Order 10571-A was issued, assigning
frequencies to Federal Government stations as of April 1, 1954. This was
the first time since 1928 that all station assignments were listed for review and confirmation by the President.'1 1
On November 4, 1954, the President appointed a Cabinet Committee
on Telecommunications Policy and Organization. The Director of ODM
served as Chairman, and the Secretaries of Defense and State were the
other members. The committee was to review all existing policies and
programs affecting all forms of electrical communications except domestic
broadcasting. The Committee did not report on January 31, 1955, as it
had been directed, and on July 3, 1957, it was officially abolished and its
responsibility assigned to the Director of ODM." 2
H. The Middle 1950's
On June 21, 1955, the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce set up an Advisory Committee on Allocations to make a survey
and reappraisal of television allocations. Dr. Bowles, Chairman of the
109.
110.
111.
112.

Ibid.
This illustration is taken from the 1959 Hearings, note 2.
Id. at 137.
Report, note 1 at 78.
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Committee, submitted his report in March of 1958. Among the recommendations were the establishment of a communications office or authority as part of the executive structure and an authoritative review of
the radio spectrum requirements of the nation as a whole, conducted at
the Executive level.118
On October 11, 1955, IRAC, pursuant to an ODM request of August
15, 1955, created the Select Subcommittee on Frequency Allocations
(SSFA) "to insure an equitable distribution of spectrum space among
various radio services, provide for the most effective utilization of the
radio spectrum, minimize harmful interference, and lay the groundwork
in preparation for the next international radio conference, devoting
increased and continuing attention to these responsibilities."1'14 The FCC
was asked to work with the subcommittee and accepted, in a "mild way,"
on November 4, 1955.115

On April 23, 1956, the Telecommunications Advisory Board (TAB)
was established by DMO-IX-2 to afford advice and guidance to the Director of ODM on telecommunications mobilization plans and related
telecommunication matters." 6
Legislative attention to the recommendations of the PCPB (the Stewart
Board) was renewed in 1957.1" On March 25, 1957, Senator Potter inquired of the Director of the ODM whether all of the frequencies allocated in radio and television to the Federal Government were being utilized sufficiently to justify continued assignment. The Director, on April
2, 1957, informed the Senator of the Joint ODM-FCC study of the use of
the band 50-300 megacycles and the conclusion (of ODM-IRAC) that
no space could be released without detriment to national defense and the
federal airways. The Senator, however, was not persuaded and on June
18, 1957, introduced Senate Joint Resolution 106 to establish a threemember commission on the allocation of radio and television frequencies.
The Commission was to investigate the use of frequencies allocated for
Federal Government utilization and to report to the President and
Congress.
As passed by the Senate on July 21, 1958, Joint Resolution 106 was
amended to provide for a five-member Commission to:
...conduct a thorough and comprehensive study and investigation of the radio and television frequencies allocated to the
various agencies and instrumentalities of the Federal Govern113.
114.
115.
116.

Hearings, note 2 at 138.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.

117. This section and the following on Sen. J.R. 106 are based in large part on pages
139-40 of Hearings, note 2.
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ment with a view to determining (1) whether such frequencies
are being efficiently utilized to the maximum degree possible;
(2) whether any (and if so, how much) of such frequencies
may, without jeopardizing the public interest, be relinquished to
the Federal Communications Commission for allocation to nongovernmental [civilian] purposes; and (3) what are the likely
future requirements of the various agencies and instrumentalities of the Federal Government for radio and television frequencies.1 18
When the companion bill was reported out by the House Committee, however, the Commission's powers were expanded to include study of civilian
frequency usage as well. Thus, as amended, it was to determine:
(1) how such frequencies may be utilized to the maximum
degree possible, (2) how planning should be undertaken to take
advantage of technological change in achieving the maximum
use of the frequency spectrum, (3) whether any (and if so, how
much) of such frequencies may, in the public interest, be reallocated to other uses, (4) the likely future requirements of the
various non-governmental [civilian] users and agencies and
instrumentalities of the Federal government for radio and television frequencies, and (5) the changes, if any, that should be
made in the existing administrative organization and procedures
for discharging the Federal government's responsibilities in this
field."'
The opposition of the broadcast industry to the House measure (since it
would have opened for attack the 70 channel UHF television allocation)
and the inability of the House and Senate to agree on the Commission's
functions resulted in the demise of both the Senate and the House
measures.
On July 1, 1958, the Federal Civil Defense Agency (FCDA) and ODM
were merged into one office, which later became the Office of Civil and
Defense Mobilization (OCDM). The telecommunications functions as
assigned to the Director of ODM by Executive Order 10460, were conferred upon the Director of OCDM by Executive Order 10773. On September 5, 1958, the OCDM Telecommunications Area was directed to
report to the Associate Director for Resources, who was to report to the
Assistant Director for Resources and Production, who was then to report
to the Director of OCDM."2 °
On November 4, 1958, OCDM Director Hoegh created the Special
Advisory Committee on Telecommunications (the Cooley Committee) to
118. Id. at 139.
119. Report No. 2355, August 2, 1958.
120. Hearings, note 2 at 142.
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assess the role of the Federal Government in telecommunications. The
Director commented:
Our economy and national defense today are highly dependent
upon the smooth functioning of our national telecommunications
services. The rapidly changing technology and changing needs
in [federal] government and non-government [civilian] areas
are presenting increasingly difficult problems in telecommunication management. The situation is becoming no less complicated
by developments in satellites and space vehicles as well as defense weapons systems.'

On December 29, 1958, the Committee submitted its report. It concluded that:
(a) any sweeping change in the regulation and control of telecommunications by the Government, and in the legislation
therefor, should be considered only after extensive study and
the development of a well-thought-out course of action; (b) in
advance of such a study, certain immediate steps can and should
be taken to strengthen the executive branch side of telecommunications management; (c) it would also seem inappropriate
to give the FCC the power to act in matters affecting the executive agencies or responsibilities relating closely to national defense or foreign affairs-these are areas of decision which belong to the President and should be his perogative to delegate;
(d) these broad discretionary functions can best be discharged
and the strengthening best 'be accomplished through the creation
of a board within the Executive Office of the President to act
for and be answerable to the President in the carrying
out of his
122
responsibilities under the Communications Act.
The Committee recommended legislation creating, in the Executive
Office of the President, a National Telecommunications Board. The
Board, which was to consist of three members, would be appointed by
the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. IRAC
was to report to and assist the Board in the performance of such functions as the Board might direct. The Board also would have continuing
functions in reviewing the national table of frequency allocations, in
cooperation with the FCC, to insure appropriate division of spectrum
space between Federal Government and civilian users. It was to study the
role of the Federal Government in the management of United States
telecommunications and the administrative organizations for discharging
the government's responsibilities with particular reference to the division
of responsibility under the 1934 Act. The Board was to make recommen121. See note 80 at 19.
122. Hearings, note 2 at 142-43.
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dations to the President concerning changes in spectrum management
and, finally, was to assume responsibility for mobilization planning for
23
telecommunications. 1

On March 3, 1959, approximately three months after submission of
the Cooley Report, the President recommended the creation of a Special
Commission on Telecommunications. In his letter to the Speaker of the
House and the President of the Senate, he said:
The telecommunications systems of the United States are essential to the national security, to the safety of life and property,
to international relations, to a better informed public, and to the
business, social, educational, religious, and political life of the
country. They are one of the Nation's most valuable assets.
Changing technology along with changing needs in [Federal]
Government and non-government [civilian] areas present problems in the telecommunication field which require searching
examination. The situation is becoming no less complicated by
prospective developments in satellites and space vehicles, as
well as in defense weapons systems.
It was not possible for the Special Advisory Committee during
its brief existence to undertake a thorough and comprehensive
study of the government's role or to make detailed studies of
such problems as radio frequency usage.
In order that such a study can be made, I recommend that Congress establish a Special Commission on Telecommunications,
to be composed of five members appointed by the President. 2 '
The same day the Director of the OCDM submitted to the Speaker of
the House and the President of the Senate a draft joint resolution for the
establishment of a commission to undertake the broad and comprehensive
study contemplated. The Commission was to study:
(1) the role of the Federal Government in the management of
the U.S. telecommunications resource; (2) the administrative
organization for discharging the Government's responsibilities
with particular reference to the division of responsibility under
the Communications Act; (3) the existing methods and procedures for allocating radio frequencies and bands of frequencies
as between Federal Government and non-Federal Government
[civilian] users; and (4) the existing national table of radio
frequency allocations with respect to the apportionment of the
various parts of the radio spectrum as between [Federal] Government and non-Government [civilian] users.' 25
123. Report, note 1 at 79.
124. Note 80 at 20.
125. Hearings, note 2 at 36-38.
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The Commission was to report back to the President, within twelve
months, the results of its study.
A number of bills were introduced to effectuate the recommendation.
Principal among these was House Joint Resolution 331 introduced on
April 7, 1959, by Representative Harris. Finally, on May 11, 1959,
Representative Harris introduced H. R. 7057 to establish a three-member
Board in the Executive Office of the President as recommended by the
Cooley Committee. This set the stage for the two day panel discussion
of June 8 and 9 in the House Subcommittee on Communications and
Power of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.
I. The 1959 Hearings
The hearings opened with a technical explanation of the radio spectrum
by Mr. Fred Alexander, Deputy Assistant Director for Telecommunications of OCDM.
When Mr. Alexander concluded his remarks, a comprehensive statement of the problem was made by Dr. Irving Stewart, who had been
Chairman of PCPB. After describing the threshold problem of many
"good" uses competing for limited frequency space, Dr. Stewart addressed himself to the "organizational aspect" of frequency management:
[Y] ou have dual control over the spectrum. You have the Federal Communications Commission composed of 7 individuals
devoting full time to the problem of communications, backed up
by a staff. True, they devote part of their attention to other than
radio matters, but essentially there is a full-time communication
management job. But when you come to the other side of the
picture, the [Federal] Government side, you have the ultimate
authority in the President of the United States as Commander
in Chief, and also exercising certain authority conferred in the
Communications Act of 1934. ...
[IRAC, to whom the President has delegated this responsibility,] is an extremely useful technical body, but it is a body composed of users. The situation is one in which naturally there is a
desire to accommodate the wishes of the users who participate.
There is nobody sitting in the position of arbiter. There is nobody who can ask too many hard questions. There is nobody
who has an over-riding task of requiring that the necessity for a
particular new assignment be established in the light of all the
assignments that have been made in the past.
Nor is it at all certain that these very competent technicians
operating at a relatively low technical level have all the informa-
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tion about policy, present and future, which might be most useful in making the wisest assignments in the light of future
needs ....
In other words, Mr. Chairman, this situation is one which is
made to order for suspicion, and there is every reason to believe
that the suspicion does exist. Every service, [Federal] Government or [civilian], is convinced of the importance of its mission.
It is natural for each [Federal] Government department to
emphasize the importance of its role; and there isn't inherent in
the situation any necessary motivation to conserve frequencies
in order that they might be available for non-Government
[civilian] use. In many cases in the assignment of frequencies,
security considerations must be taken into account, and that
means that justifications for the assignments cannot be made a
matter of record.
And then when you have no public record, you have another
fertile ground for suspicion. Perhaps the assignment was justified but it is going to be pretty hard to convince the man who
loses out that it was justified.

The need, the important thing, is to correct the organizational
arrangement; in the first instance to bring the Government's
side of the picture into a posture where there is high level consideration in terms of possible requirements.' 2 6
As foreshadowed in the above quotation, nearly every one of the participants in the 1959 Hearings was critical of IRAC's role in management
of the Federal Governmental sphere of spectrum allocation. IRAC was a
"body composed of users." Nobody could ask the "hard questions."
No12 7
body could require "justification" for frequency assignments.
Mr. Harold Fellows, President of the National Association of Broadcasters, testified in pertinent part, as follows:
[A]Ithough all the non-Government [civilian] users present
information of use and justification for what they request in the
spectrum, similar information is not submitted with respect to
the [Federal] Government use of the spectrum which might indicate how the entire natural resource could best be utilized.
The [Federal] Government users are not required to justify
126. Id. at 33-35.

127. Note 80 at 21.
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before Congress, public opinion, or any impartial body, their
use of frequencies.
In certain areas, there seems to be an unwillingness on the
part of [Federal] Government representatives to freely discuss
problems of concern to all of us, and there is certainly an inability on the part of non-Government [civilian] users to obtain
the information regarding Government usage which is pertinent
to any resolution of the problems.
There was initial disagreement on the mechanism for the assignment of frequencies, which led to establishment of the Interdepartmental Radio Advisory Committee and the current situation where the non-Government [civilian] use is an open book
-with full justification-and the [Federal] Government use is
a closed book, with no comparable justification to that required
of non-Government [civilian] users.
We believe, too, that the solution to the entire problem is the
proper administration of all the spectrum used by both [Federal] Government and non-Government [civilian]. This will
eventually supply an answer to the myriad of service problems
which tend to confuse and retard the orderly expansion of these
services in the best interest of the American people. 28
Mr. Victor Cooley, who had been Chairman of the Special Advisory
Committee on Telecommunications, testified to similar effect:
I think it has been pointed out that the public side as administered by the FCC is handled in a very thorough manner. Public
hearings are held, of course, and as Mr. Fellows just stated,
justification must be made for any assignment of frequency.
On the other hand, on the [Federal] Government side we don't
find such a thorough and businesslike approach to the question
of assignment, because there is no authoritative voice any place
in the Government except the President, or the Director of the
Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization acting for the President who may resolve a controversy or say how [Federal] Government frequencies shall be assigned. Now IRAC is a committee of representatives of agencies involved in the usage of radio
frequencies, and they are very competent people.
128. Hearings, note 2 at 36-38.
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They understand the use of the spectrum, but as has been
pointed out, there is no one on IRAC that has any authority
whatever to say that the Defense Department request shall
prevail-for instance, if Defense wants something and if Commerce wants the same thing, or if some other agency is interested in the same frequency, there is no one that can say, after
hearing all facts, "This frequency should go to Defense or that
frequency should go to Commerce."
Despite this organizational deficiency, it is only fair to say
that according to my understanding up to now, every agency has
received by and large what they needed.
But a lot of it has been through compromise and trading back
and forth, not because any group or board with authority to
handle such things has decided after full examination that this
frequency should go here or this one should go there. That is
the main thing that I should say, the main conclusion that our
committee came to, that there should be on the [Federal] Government's side the kind of examination and study and evaluation of frequency assignments with an authoritative voice acting
on behalf of the President to make these assignments that prevail on the non-Government [civilian] side.
[W]hereas the FCC decides in an authoritative evaluated way
whether or not an assignment should be made to this applicant
or that applicant there is no one that does that on the [Federal]
Government's side. On the [Federal] Government's side if
Navy, for instance, needs a particular frequency and the Air
Force say they need the same frequency, although they start
out wanting the same frequency, they can probably by compromise decide that maybe another frequency will do for Navy or
Air Force can get along with a different one.' 29
As to negotiations between IRAC and the FCC in the event of a
contest between Federal Government and civilian requests for a particular band, the following discussion with the then-Chairman of the FCC,
Mr. Doerfer, appears very pertinent:
The Chairman. Is it not a fact that right now OCDM has
asked the Federal Communications Commission to give up aviation channels, 8500 megacycles, for Federal Government use,
and the Commission has done so, solely on your statement. Is
that true?
Mr. Doerfer. That is correct.
129. Id. at 49-50, 52.
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The Chairman. And also is it not a fact that on that action
there is litigation pending at the moment?
Mr. Doerfer. That is right.
The Chairman. There is the example, Mr. Moss.
Mr. Doerfer. There is no litigation between the Federal
Communications Commission and the Office of Civil Defense.
Mr. Moss. And the Federal Communications Commission,
having great confidence in the OCDM, accommodated them?
Mr. Doerfer. On the basis that the OCDM was responsible
for the national security to a much closer and greater extent
than we are, and we were in position to do that with respect to
that.
So that, when they indicated that they wanted that, we could
not find any specific authority in the act whereby we could say
no. We did the other thing.
Mr. Moss. Is there any specfic authority in the act that makes
that possible for them?
Mr. Doerfer. No; other than when you say "they". I have in
mind the President. OCDM is asking for the President.
Mr. Moss. I think this gets to a rather important question,
Mr. Chairman:
That you give up something to another Government agency,
just on the mere representation that you should do it. You have
not had a hearing which would enable you to determine whether
the request is a proper one or not; whether, in fact, the security
of the Nation is involved. As you probably know, for 4 years I
have spent some time on another committee where I have had
Government witnesses say that security is involved here, and
I have found that the security was so remote and nebulous that
it would be almost impossible to identify it.
There is no one here on behalf of the communications agencies to say, or to determine whether or not the Government
agency is making a valid case, whether there is a compelling
Government requirement for the channels it has requested.3 0
Mr. Doerfer. I think that is a correct statement.
And, finally, the testimony of General Quesada, himself concerned
with spectrum allocation on the Federal Government side for some twenty
years, is worthy of quotation:
Now I must say to you in all sincerity that my memory
130. Id. at 87-88.

DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 4:1

searching back over the 20 years tells me that in practically
every case I was subjective and not objective. I was a contestant. I hoped for a status quo, at least a status quo in respect to
what I had. I often sought what somebody else had, and this is
characteristic not only of me, but of practically everybody who
has ever been involved in this problem. It is an occupational
disease, if I may refer to it as such. It is a frailty of human
nature, also.
Now it isn't uncommon for a person, and I have to say perhaps I have been guilty of this, to harbor my frequencies or to
harbor an assignment of frequencies even to the point of denying data and information as to their use. It isn't uncommon to
generate use when a frequency is challenged. I personally feel
that IRAC is not as effective as it should be and I personally
feel that it is almost ineffective. And I say this being a party to
it, and I say it knowing that perhaps I contribute to its ineffectiveness. I must cite the reasons.
There are 12 members of IRAC. Each member is a contestant
with and against other members. Under those circumstances I
doubt the ability of any member to be really objective. I doubt
very seriously. Again if this is the case, I would attribute it to
the frailties of human nature.'
A number of the panelists favored H. R. 7057 which would have created a three-member National Communications Board with the task of
improving government management and as a vehicle for negotiating with
the FCC on a coordinated long range allocation policy. While further
spectrum studies were proposed by some panelists," 2 the group favoring
H. R. 7057 believed that such studies would merely delay an organizational solution which was sorely needed. Their view, further, was that if
cooperation between the NCB and the FCC did not materialize, it would
then be appropriate to study the necessity for a single agency or superboard.' Others believed that a single agency was necessary and desirable at the outset and hence frowned upon H. R. 7057.
In consequence, no definitive conclusions or recommendations were
forthcoming from the hearings. Substantial talent had been assembled,
the pressing problems of frequency allocation were once again well articulated, but no kind of consensus had developed.
J. The Bendix Litigation
The year 1959 was also significant as the date of the Bendix case. On
April 11, 1958, the ODM had transmitted to IRAC and the FCC proposals for revising the national table of frequency allocations. The FCC
131. Id. at 196-97.
132. E.g., Hearings, note 2 at 236 (testimony of Mr. Everett).
133. Note 80 at 25.
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was advised that changes in the national table of frequency allocation
were of such urgency to national defense that immediate consideration
was paramount. Discussions between IRAC and the FCC respecting the
table of frequency allocations above 27.5 Mc/s in preparation for the
1959 Radio Conference dated back to December 3, 1957. However, the
April 11 proposal was to the effect that defense considerations precluded
34
further delay.1
Accordingly, on April 16, 1958, the FCC adopted Order FCC 58-379
which made certain allocation changes immediately, without first obtaining public comment. The effect of this action was to change the existing
shared use of 420-450 Mc/s to exclusive use of the Federal Government.
Further, the 8500-9000 Mc/s frequency, previously a shared use for
radio-navigation between Federal Government and civilian, was allocated
to exclusive Federal Government use for radio positioning, subject to
temporary sharing on terms less favorable than before to civilian users.
As a result, representatives of industry and commercial aviation petitioned the FCC to vacate the April 16 Order, particularly the allocation
changes for frequency bands 420-450 and 8750 Mc/s. The OCDM opposed the petitions of the aviation and industry groups on the ground of
national defense requirements. Finally, on July 30, 1958, the FCC
adopted: (1) Order FCC 58-745 denying the petitions to vacate its April
16 Order; and (2) Order FCC 58-750 making final the allocation of
13,250-13,400 Mc/s for aeronautical radionavigation (the doppler navigator). On August 29, 1958, Bendix Aviation Corp. filed, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, Appeal No. 14,650
from FCC Order 58-745.1"
As noted above, the reason for the FCC Order was an OCDM request
to the FCC for a reclassification of frequencies because of defense requirements. While the FCC revealed from the outset that such representations had been made to it as a basis for the requested allocation changes,
it never disclosed the reasons underlying the defense requirement request, invoking its power to "withhold publication of records of proceedings containing secret information affecting the national defense."' 1 6
Thus, the FCC merely stated in the April Order:
Based upon the representations that have been submitted to it
concerning the requirements of national defense, the Commission finds that it would be in the public interest to amend its
7
rules to permit the orderly satisfaction of those requirements."3
In its July Order (58-745), the FCC stated similarly:
This action was taken on the basis of representations made rela134. Hearings, note 2 at 142.

135. Ibid.
136. Federal Communications Act of 1934, § 4j.

137. Note 80 at 36.
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tive to the performance of functions vital to the national defense. Moreover, the OCDM has informed the Commission that
the granting of the requests in the various petitions for reconsideration would have a serious effect on national defense capabilities. The public interest, therefore, requires that the several
requests for reconsideration, hearing, stay and/or reallocation
be denied.
It was the July 31 Order from which Bendix appealed, asserting in
pertinent part that the Commission had erred in dismissing without a
hearing the Bendix application for experimental use of the 430 Mc frequency in two of its aircraft, and questioning, in fact, the very legality
of the procedures by which the initial decision was made.
On November 13, 1959, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia delivered its decision."" s Bendix's argument on the absence
of a hearing was dismissed summarily on the ground that "when the
Bendix application was filed, the frequency of 430 Mc had already been
withdrawn from the field of non-Government [civilian] use except as
the Commission authorized temporary use of the frequency until February 15, 1963, for the radio altimeters and for amateurs service."" 9
On the second point, i.e., the legality of the Commission's initial action,
the court analyzed at some length the authority of the Commission under
its enabling act and particularly Executive Order 10460. In upholding
FCC Order 58-745, the court declared national defense needs to be
"paramount." 40 The court said:
We have fully appreciated the importance of the issue. We do
not question that Bendix is competent and qualified. We recognize the depth of the conflict between the demands of the Executive on the one hand and of private but important non-Government [civilian] entities on the other. Various possibilities of
abuse can be conjured were we to speculate, but we cannot assume and there is no slightest suggestion of record, that there
has been a "perversion of the Commission's administrative processes for an improper purpose." On the contrary, the action
complained of reflects compliance with the position of the
Executive taken in the national interest. A reading of the terms
of Executive Order 10460 demonstrates its harmonious accommodation to emergencies which Congress in writing the Communications Act must have foreseen. Thus tested the Commission's
action, pursuant to Sections 1, 4(i), and 303(c), (f), (g), and
(r) of the Act, was authorized.
138. Bendix Aviation Corp. v. FCC, 272 F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir. 1959),
sub nom. Aeronautical Radio, Inc. v. United States, 361 U.S. 965 (1960).
139. 272 F.2d 533, 536.
140. Id. at 538.

cert. denied
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National trust and responsibility must be reposed somewhere
and in this situation, by Section 305 of the Communications Act
and otherwise, they are centered in the President with all his
vast power. He is the Commander in Chief. That the national
emergency declared in Proclamation No. 2914 has occasioned
continued and still present concern is public knowledge.
Bendix, substantially on the grounds treated, has attacked
the Commission's denial of its requested experimental license
authority, despite the fact that the frequency it sought was no
longer available for non-Government [civilian] use. We are
satisfied that the challenged action of the Commission must be
sustained and accordingly, the dismissal of the Bendix applications and the denial of reconsideration were proper.14'
K. The 1960's
The 1960's commenced with a significant report by the Library of
Congress for then-Senator Lyndon Johnson's Committee on Aeronautical
and Space Sciences. The Report observed:
Successful scientific exploration of outer space and application
of the results for both peaceful and military purposes depends
critically upon reliable and uncluttered radio communications
between vehicles in space and ground stations. Similarly, the
study of feeble radio signals from unknown extraterrestrial
sources, which some day may permit all weather navigation as
men now steer by the stars, requires complete freedom from
radio interference. Without such control over users of the
radio frequency spectrum, there is serious risk that vital data
from difficult and costly experiments will be lost, or even worse,
the lives of human space passengers. Jamming of radio signals
which could deflect satellites from their course is an ever present
danger at launching or during reentry, so that inadequate control of radio transmissions also represents a clear hazard to life
and property of the general public. 4 2
The basic problem, in the view of the Report, was one of management.
It was clear that the spectrum was a public resource and should therefore
be managed and allocated "as though it were a rare and limited mineral."' 43 Dual control clearly did not meet this requirement, as the Report
concluded, quoting Loeber's Regulations and Administration of Telecommunications in the United States (p. 92 of the Report):
With respect to national policy, none has yet been formulated
141.
142.
Progress
143.

Id. at 539-40.
President's Communications Policy Board, Telecommunications, A Program for
83 (1951).
Id. at 28.
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and adopted which clarifies the dual control of the radio frequency spectrum by the FCC and the IRAC .. .no criteria

have been established between the conflicting needs of Federal
Government and non-government [civilian] users ....

Just as

the United States lacks a clear policy for dividing the spectrum
among its own users, so it lacks a policy for guidance in preparing the national position for international negotiations.' 4 4
After the Presidential election of 1960, James Landis was appointed
by President-elect Kennedy to study and make recommendations respecting communications management. In December, Mr. Landis outlined
the lack of coordination in both the international and national communications field. Neither the State Department nor the OCDM has been able
to provide the necessary leadership because their other activities were too
varied to permit communications to reach the high level of concern that
it warranted. He recommended the creation, within the Executive Office
of the President, of an office for the Coordination and Development of
Communications Policy, and that there be transferred to this office14 5all
the powers relating to telecommunications then vested in OCDM.
As a result of these recommendations, but not in conformity with them,
the new President created, by Executive Order 10995, a new office within
the White House, i.e., Director of Telecommunications Management in
the Office of Emergency Planning (OEP). The office was to be held by
an assistant director of OEP. The OEP Director was delegated authority
under section 305 of the 1934 Act "to assign, amend, modify or revoke
Federal Government frequency assignments, and he was authorized in
turn to redelegate this authority as well as that conferred by Executive
Order 10705.""' Executive Order 10460 was revoked.
The functions to be performed by the new office were as follows:
It was the job of the Director of Telecommunications Management, subject to the authority and control of the President,
to coordinate telecommunications activities of the executive
branch and to be responsible for formulating the general policies
after consultation with appropriate agencies. He was to promote and encourage the adoption of uniform policies and standards by agencies authorized to operate telecommunications
systems; develop data with regard to Federal Government
frequency requirements; encourage research and development
in the field and contract for studies and reports. 4 7
The redelegation of functions from the OEP Director of the Director
144. Ibid.
145. See Report, note 1 at 79.
146. Id. at 79-80.
147. Id. at 80.
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of Telecommunications Management was consummated in February of
1962. OEP also directed IRAC to report to the Director and, subject to
his approval, to assign frequencies on an interim basis.
In August of 1962, the Communications Satellite Act'48 was passed.
Several additional responsibilities were thereby reposed in the President.
These included the coordination of the activities of Federal
Government Agencies with responsibilities in the field of telecommunications, so as to insure effective compliance with the
policies of the Communications Satellite Act and the attainment
of "coordinated and effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum," and the technical compatability of the system with existing communications facilities.' 49
It will be recalled that the Director of Telecommunications Management, under Executive Orders 10705 and 10995, was charged with
the duties of coordinating telecommunication activities of Federal
agencies and of formulating Government policy. The President thus
possessed a ready source for advice and assistance. Nevertheless, he
made no formal delegation of his duties under the Communications
Satellite Act of 1962 until the National Communications System was
established by him a year later. 150
On June 5, 1963, President Kennedy established an ad hoc Communications Satellite Group under the joint chairmanship of Deputy Attorney
General Katzenbach and Director of the Office of Science and Technology, Dr. Wiesner. The purpose of the Group was to provide a forum for
the various Federal Government agencies concerned with satellite communications and to provide coordination on an informal basis.' 5'
October and November of 1962 brought the Cuban Missile crisis and
with it was accentuated the "inadequacy of Federal Governmental communications in carrying a very heavy load of high priority traffic under
emergency conditions." The result was an Interdepartmental Committee
on Communications under the Chairmanship of then-Deputy Under Secretary of State Orrick.
Then, on August 21, 1963, upon the completion of the Orrick Committee's work, the President established the National Communications
System.' 52 The objective of the NCS was to provide a
unified Federal Governmental communications system for operation under all conditions ranging from a normal situation to
148. 76 STAT. 419.

149.
150.
151.
152.

Report, note 1 at 80-81.
Id. at 81.
Ibid.
1964 Hearings, pt. 1, app. 4B, p. 592.
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national emergencies and international crises, including nuclear
attack. Initial emphasis, however, of the system was to be on
meeting the critical needs for communications in national
security programs, particularly to overseas areas. 5 3
The work of NCS has been described as follows:
The NCS was conceived as comprising primarily the longhaul, point-to-point trunk communications capable of serving
one or more executive agencies. By now, the system includes
communications facilities of, and channels available to, the
Departments of Defense and State, the Federal Aviation
Agency, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration,
and the General Services Administration.
The NCS includes important communications capabilities necessary for command and control of our military forces and foreign
crisis, but networks devoted to tactical and other limited and
local needs are specifically excluded. Domestic communications
needs of the Federal agencies dealing with civil functions are
met by the Federal Telecommunications System, established in
1961 and managed by the General Services Administration, and
which is now incorporated in the NCS. Additional governmental
communications components are being studied for the possible
inclusion in the NCS.
The NCS is being developed not as a single, but rather as an
integrated system in which the various governmental networks
are linked and managed by separate organizations according to
standardized and unified policies and plans. The kinds of communications available in the system include telephone, message,
facsimile, and data carried over an assortment of facilities such
as radio, microwave, landline, submarine cable, and others.
Satellite communications will take their place among these
facilities as they become available, but are expected to supplement other methods, rather than replace them, for some time at
least.
The policy direction and guidance of the National Communications System are the responsibility of the Director of Telecommunications Management under the President's memorandum of August 21, 1963. The Director, according to the
memorandum, also serves as Special Assistant to the President
for Telecommunications. Nothing specifically was said in the
President's memorandum about the possible relevance to the
NCS of the new art of satellite communications, but the Presi153. Report, note 1 at 82.
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dent, in giving tasks to his Special Assistant, also charged him
with the duty of assisting the President with respect to his
coordinating and other functions under the Communications
Satellite Act of 1962.15
The post of Director of Telecommunications Management was at this
time vacant. In the interim, Dr. Wiesner, the President's science adviser,
was designated to perform the functions pertaining to NCS which had
been assigned to the Director in his new role as Special Assistant to the
President. Without the guidance of a full-time Director, the Secretary
of Defense moved ahead with his own tasks under the August 21 directive. The Secretary, as executive agent of NCS, was to design, develop
and operate NCS. In this capacity, he began to negotiate with the Communications Satellite Corporation to effect a joint system of control and
operation. A further letter from the White House to Secretary McNamara
on March 26, 1964, gave Presidential authorization to the Secretary of
Defense, as executive agent for NCS, to arrange with the corporation
for procurement of satellite communications services for NCS in accordance with its needs. 5
The fact that negotiations were carried on without participation of
other federal agencies indicates that communications coordination was still
not at optimum levels even in the Federal Government sphere. NASA
and State were not even consulted.'5 6 Finally, in April of 1964, the President filled the post of Director of Telecommunications Management with
the appointment of General O'Connell. As the Military Operations Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations observed
in its 1964 Report on Satellite Communications:
General O'Connell, the new appointee brought to the situation
the high-level attention it required, and, as noted above, he
participated actively in the final analyses and deliberations
which culminated in the Defense Department's decision to
abandon the idea of a joint commercial-Government system and
in the conclusion of an international agreement covering the
future ownership and direction of the global commercial communications satellite system.' 57
While noting these developments, however, the Report concluded by
enumerating four basic problems still to be faced by the Director. These
conclusions demonstrate that the old problems remain, made once again
more acute by advancing technology and expanded needs. Thus:
(1) Optimum utilization of the frequency spectrum.-Dual
154. Id. at 82-83.
155. 1964 Hearings, pt. 1, p. 463.

156. Report, note 1 at 85.
157. Ibid.
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seems to be a permanent feature, and therefore the

need is one of better coordination and efficient administration.
IRAC often has been described as a "logrolling" operation, and
the processing of agency applications is a slow one. This process
could be streamlined, particularly if the Office of the Director
of Telecommunications were strengthened.
(2) Exploitation of an expanding technology.-Although inventions and changes cannot be planned, their use can be. Moreover, an atmosphere can be created within Government which
encourages research and development, while retaining some
measure of centralized control and review.
(3) Adequate guidance and planning of the national communications system.-As the establishment of the NCS goes
forward, attention should be given to the overall Government
responsibility for communications. This should come from a
central source, already identified in the President's memorandum of August 1963 as the Director of Telecommunications
Management, also acting as Special Assistant to the President
for Telecommunications. Furthermore, although emphasis is
now being given to critical national security needs, the planning
effort if properly and thoroughly accomplished will insure that
decisions with respect to the entire range of governmental communications, both military and civil, will not be prematurely
preempted.
(4) Achievement of U.S. satellite communications policy.The Satellite Communications Act of 1962 sets forth a wide
range of governmental objectives in the area of satellite systems,
potentially in conflict with each other. The act places heavy responsibilities on the President to effect these goals as well as to
avoid conflicts. By the memorandum of August 1963, the Director of Telecommunications Management was specifically
charged with assisting the President in carrying out his responsibilities. The Director may need a fuller delegation of powers
so as to afford Government management at the highest level of
this developing new field. Surveillance of this area cannot be
confined to the activities of the commercial system but must also
extend to the possibilities of Government use of this medium. 158
While it is noteworthy that the Military Operations Sub-Committee
referred to the "dual control" of the spectrum by the FCC and the
President (by IRAC) as seemingly "a permanent feature," it is significant
that it did so without enthusiasm, in company with so many others who
158. Id. at 86-87.
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have analyzed the problem of radio frequency allocation in the past
twenty years.
Developments during the past two years have, if anything, accentuated
pressure on the spectrum. Thus, the all-channel legislation of 19621 and
the recent FCC action terminating its seven-year-old proceeding16 ° have,
for the present at least, effectively removed 535 Mc/s of frequency spectrum (70 TV channels of UHF) from consideration for possible reallocation to other competing uses, civilian as well as Federal Government. 16'
In this situation, the need becomes imperative for optimum levels of
management capability. A system is required that will guarantee the most
equitable distribution of frequency usage, consistent with the national
interest. Before turning to an evaluation of current management practices, however, the organizational structure in which allocation decisions
themselves are made is in order. This is the subject of Part II.
II.

PRESENT ALLOCATION AND ASSIGNMENT PRACTICES

As shown in Part I, government management of allocation and assignment practices is presently bifurcated. The Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) is charged with the responsibility for the assignment
and regulation of frequencies used by civilian users, whereas the President is responsible for the allocation of frequencies to Federal Government users. This latter responsibility, the President has delegated to the
Director of Telecommunications management with the assistance of the
Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee (IRAC).' The procedures
employed under this dual framework of allocation and assignment practice, both civilian and Federal Government, are the subject of this Part.
159. 76 STAT. 150.

160. FCC Order No. 64-264, request to reconsider denied FCC Order No. 64-451.
161. Congressional intent is clear that "the use of all 82 channels" is required for a
national television system. Thus, House Report No. 1559, 87th Cong., states:
All of the 82 channels allocated for television use, however, will be required
if the goal of an adequate educational and commercial television is to be achieved.
The proposed all-channel legislation is the only workable method by which this
goal can be achieved.
Senate Report No. 1526 of the 87th Congress states in the same vein:
In view of the long difficult history of the television allocations structure since
1952, the committee is impressed by the judgment of the Commission that
development of an adequate, truly nationwide television system requires the
use of all 82 channels and it is for this reason that it is urging the enactment of this
legislation.
The Senate Report goes on to state:
We emphasize that the aim of this measure is an intermixed television system
using both 12 VHF and 70 UHF channels.
1. Executive Order 10995.
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A. FCC Allocation and Assignment Practice
(1) In General
At the outset a distinction should be made between frequency allocation among the various usages, e.g., fixed mobile, aeronautical radionavigational, amateur broadcasting, etc., and assignments to particular users
within a particular allocation, e.g., to Station XYZ, rather than a competing applicant, to use a particular frequency within the broadcast allocation. The Communications Act of 1934, as amended, endows the FCC
with both functions as the following excerpt from section 303 of the Act
indicates:
Section 303. Except as otherwise provided in this Act, the
Commission from time to time, as public convenience, interest,
or necessity requires, shall-(a) Classify radio stations;
(b) Prescribe the nature of the service to be rendered by
each class of licensed stations and each station within any class;
(c) Assign bands of frequencies to the various classes of
stations; and assign frequencies for each individual station and
determine the power which each station shall use and the time
during which it may operate.
The distinction is not merely academic, because different procedures
obtain depending upon which of these types of decisions is being made,
i.e., allocation or assignment. The difference lies in the fact that decisions
respecting the table of allocations generally, e.g., the shift of a particular
band from television to fixed mobile, involves rule-making,2 whereas the
assignment of a particular frequency within a designated band usage to a
particular applicant, accomplished through licensing, is adjudication.$
Both the Federal Administrative Procedure Act4 and the FCC Rules and
Regulations 5 follow this distinction.
2. See, e.g., discussion at notes 163-65 in Part I.
3. See Sections 2(d) and 2(e) of the APA.
4. 60 STAT. 237:
The objectives of the Federal APA have been stated as follows:
1. It provides that agencies must issue as rules certain specified information
as to their organization and procedure, and also make available other
materials of administrative law. (Section 3)
2. It states the essentials of the several forms of administrative proceedings
(Sections 4, 5, and 6) and the limitations on administrative powers. (Section 9)
3. It provides in more detail the requirements for administrative hearings and
decisions in cases in which statutes require such hearings. (Sections 7 and 8)
4. It sets forth a simplified statement of judicial review designed to afford a
remedy for every legal wrong. (Section 10)
United States Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Federal Administrative
Procedure Act, Report of the Committee on the Judiciary, 79th Congress, 1st Session,
on S. 7 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1945), pp. 6-7.
5. Contrast FCC Rules, Part I, Subpart C, §§ 1.411-1.427 (Rule-Making) with
§§ 0.441-0.453, 1.11-.1119, §§ 2.100-2.603 (Adjudication).
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In passing it should be noted that the FCC is one of the agencies of
government most affected by the APA. As observed by a former General
Counsel of the FCC:
Of all the federal administrative agencies

. . .

the Federal

Communications Commission (FCC) furnishes the most conspicuous example of the use of licensing as the weapon of regulation. It is true that, under the very broad definition of "license"
in the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, most of the other
agencies also make use of this weapon but none, I think, does so
to the same extent, or in the same all-embracing manner, or over
a subject matter having equal significance.
My discussion begins, and will end, with the thought that no
field of administrative procedure presents greater problems, or
is open to greater abuses, or has been less adequately explored
than licensing. I need not tell you what rapid strides it has made
in recent years as a favorite method of government of achieving
regulatory purposes. The FCC may be regarded as the principal
laboratory where experimentation in its possibilities and dangers
has been carried on. It is appropriate, therefore, that considerable attention should be focused on the impact of the new statute
of this agency.'
It has been said that the difference (noted above) between rule-making
and adjudication is the very basis of the Federal APA. Thus, Mr. Justice
Clark, when Attorney General, wrote as follows:
[T]he entire Act is based upon a dichotomy between rule
making and adjudication. Examination of the legislative history
of the definitions and of the differences in the required procedures for rule making and for adjudication discloses highly
practical concepts of rule making and adjudication. Rule
making is agency action which regulates the future conduct of
either groups of persons or a single person; it is essentially legislative in nature, not only because it operates in the future, but
also because it is primarily concerned with policy considerations.
The object of the rule making proceeding is the implementation
or prescription of law or policy for the future, rather than the
evaluation of a respondent's past conduct. Typically, the issues
relate not to the evidentiary facts, as to which the veracity and
demeanor of witnesses would often be important, but rather to
the policy-making conclusions to be drawn from the facts ....

Conversely, adjudication is concerned with the determination of
6. Caldwell, The Federal Communications Commission, in THE FEDERAL ADMIISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES (Warren ed. 1947).
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past and present rights and liabilities. Normally, there is involved a decision as to whether past conduct was unlawful, so
that the proceeding is characterized by an accusatory flavor
and may result in disciplinary action. Or, it may involve
the determination of a person's right to benefits under existing
law so that the issues relate to whether he is within the established category of persons entitled to such benefits. In such proceedings, the issues of fact are often sharply controverted ... .7
As a result of the distinction and its legal implications, separate treatment is herein accorded to allocation between usages or services (rulemaking) and licensing of particular users within a usage allocation
(adjudication).
(2) Rule-Making
As suggested above, both the APA and the FCC, by its Rules and
Regulations, have provisions governing rule-making proceedings. The
provisions are phrased in general terms, inasmuch as their application
extends far beyond changes in the existing allocation table. Since such
changes, however, fall within the contemplation of the provisions relating
to rule-making,8 they form the necessary vehicle through which allocation
decisions must be made.
The applicable sections of the APA are 2 (c) and 4. Section 2 (c) in defining those situations to which the requirements of the rule-making section,
i.e., 4, apply, employs the "effect-in-time" test,9 first announced by Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. Thus, a rule, as opposed to
an order or adjudication, means the "whole or any part of any agency
statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed
to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy. .

.

. 'Rule making'

means agency process for the formulation, amendment, or repeal of a
rule."' 0 As decisions with respect to the allocation table clearly comport
with this definition, changes therein consist of rule-making within the
meaning of the APA and section 4 must be complied with.
Assuming the applicability of section 4, interested parties are assured
four guarantees. First, section 4(a) requires notice of the proposed rule
making to be published in the Federal Register. The notice requirements
are rather specific, and include (1) a statement of the time, place, and
nature of public rule-making proceedings; (2) reference to the authority
under which the rule is proposed; and (3) either the terms or substance
of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved.
7. CLARK, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL OF ADMIISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 14 (1947).
8. 66 STAT. 713.
9. See Schwartz, A Decade of Administrative Law, 51 MIcH. L.R. 775, 801 (1953).
10. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226 (1908).
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Second, section 4(b) requires that "interested persons" be afforded an
"opportunity to participate in the rule making." The form of the participation, i.e., written submission or oral hearing, is confided to the discretion of the agency. Third, section 4(b) requires that prior to promulgation of the rule, the agency must consider "all relevant matter
presented," and incorporate in any rules adopted "a concise general
statement of their basis and purpose."" Fourth, section 4(d) provides
that the agency shall "accord any interested person the right to petition
for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule."
The applicable FCC provisions appear in Part I, Practice and Procedure, Subpart C, §§ 1.411-1.427, of the FCC Regulations. The FCC
Rules follow the APA requirements fairly closely. Thus, section 1.412
requires that notice be given of any proposed rule making by publication
in the Federal Register. This may, however, be waived where "impracticable, unnecessary or contrary to the public interest." Section 1.413 is
practically identical with section 4 of the APA in the three notice requirements prescribed. Also similar are section 1.415 in which interested persons have the "opportunity to participate"' 2 (the form is here, too, made
discretionary with the Commission), and section 1.425 which requires
that the Commission "consider all relevant comments and material of
record before taking final action in a rule making proceeding." Finally,
the Commission must render a written decision with a statement of its
reasons therefor.
It is noteworthy that both section 4 of the APA and the FCC Regulations afford "interested parties" two rights that they would not otherwise possess, i.e., antecedent publicity (notice) and opportunity to participate (a hearing). Notice and hearing, the very essence of procedural
due process, do not constitutionally obtain in rule-making proceedings.
As Mr. Justice Holmes observed:
Where a rule of conduct applies to more than a few people it
is impracticable that everyone should have a direct voice in its
adoption. The Constitution does not require all public acts to be
done in town meeting or an assembly of the whole ....

There

must be a limit to individual argument in such matters if
government is to go on.3
It is necessary to point out, however, that although the requirements
of notice and hearing are provided by statute and must thus be com11. The significance of the rule is, of course, limited by the decision in United States
v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941).
12. The language is identical to that in APA, Section 4(b).
13. Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization of Colorado, 239
U.S. 441 (1915).
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plied with, rule-making is not, by this means, elevated to the same level
as adjudication. Where adjudication is involved, due process does obtain,
assuming a "right" rather than a "privilege" is in issue,". and a full trialtype hearing is required.'" The hearing provided by the APA and the FCC
Regulations, on the other hand, extends only so far as the statute provides. For example, under neither section 4 of the APA nor the FCC
Regulations is an oral hearing required. That is a matter within the discretion of the Commission. On the other hand, were adjudication involved, and thus a due process hearing necessitated, serious constitutional
problems would exist with respect to denial of an oral hearing if a material issue of fact were present.' 6
In addition to allocation decisions themselves, rule-making is also employed by the Commission "for determining the justification for use and
the details of frequency assignments to non-Federal Government [civilian] users in certain services.... These rules vary, depending upon the
class of service being rendered, 17the type of equipment available, and the
responsibility of the licensees.'

The rule-making authority delegated to the Commission is extremely
broad, and has been upheld as constitutional. As stated by the Attorney
General's Committee on Administrative Procedure:
Vast rule-making powers have been delegated to the Commission, which is to be guided by the standard of public
convenience, interest and necessity in promulgating regulations ....

18

The validity of the delegation of power to the Commission under this standard was established even before its creation, in Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Bros., Bond St.
Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 266 (1933).'"
The rules promulgated, "delineate what constitute such public interest,
convenience, and necessity under various situations."" The present Rules
of Practice and Radio Regulations of the FCC Rules are divided into
twenty-three parts as follows: 2
14. Cf. Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
15. See generally, JAFE & NATmANSON, ADMINIsTRATIVE LAW 562-98 (2d ed. 1961).
16. See generally, BuRaus, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 41-71 (1963).

17. MAcQuIvEY, FREQUENcy ASSIGNMENT ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL 187-88 (1956).
18. Document No. 186, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (Monograph, p. 3).
19. See also, National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
20. MACQuIvEY, note 17, at 188.
21. PIKE & FISHER, 1 RADIO REGULATION 49:1 (Current Service).
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Title of Part
Commission organization
Practice and procedure
Frequency allocations and radio
treaty matters; general rules
and regulations
Radio broadcast services
Experimental, auxiliary and
special broadcast services
Experimental radio services
(other than broadcast)
Stations on land in the maritime
services
Stations on shipboard in the
maritime services
Aviation services
Public safety radio services
Industrial radio services
Amateur radio service
Commercial radio operators
Public fixed stations and stations
in the maritime services in
Alaska
Radio frequency devices
Land transportation radio services
Construction, marking, and lighting
of antenna structures
Industrial, scientific, and medical
equipment
Citizens radio service
Disaster communications service
Domestic public radio services
(other than maritime mobile)
International fixed public
radiocommunication services
Satellite communications

Former
Part
Number

Redesignated
Part
Number

0
1

0
1

2

2

3

73

4

74

5

5

7

81

8
9
10
11
12
13

83
87
98
91
97
13

It will be observed that the Rules relate to general matters, e.g., the
first three parts, as well as to specific radio services, e.g., radio broadcast.
Most significant for purposes of this study are those in Part 2 entitled
"Frequency Allocations and Radio Treaty Matters; General Rules and
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Regulations." These are the rules which contain the present Allocation
Table.
The FCC Rules are very detailed and comprehensive in most instances.
They have been developed in a number of ways. All, of course, are within
the terms of existing radio and general law, notably the Communications
Act of 1934, and the requirements of the rule-making Regulations of
Subpart C, as well as section 4 of the APA quoted above. 2 This is the
framework within which allocation decisions are made.
(3) Adjudication
Whereas rule-making is general in applicability and looks to the future,
adjudication is particularized and operates on past or existing facts."
The significance of the distinction resides in the constitutional right (or
its absence) to a trial-type hearing where private rights or obligations
are involved.24
The determination of which of competing applicants will be awarded
a particular frequency involves particularized applicability, i.e., is concerned with the applicants for the particular frequency in issue and not
all applicants for any frequency. Moreover, the determination is based in
substantial part upon past and present facts, e.g., the extent of local
participation and broadcast experience.2 5
For "due process" to attach, however, with its attendant judicialized
notice and hearing requirements, more is required than that adjudication rather than rule-making be involved. As it has ordinarily been
phrased, archaic though it sounds, a "right" rather than a "privilege"
must be in question. 6 Traditionally, a license has been considered to be
in the nature of a privilege.2" Thus, though a person be affected in his
particularized personal interest and past or present facts form the basis
of the decision, whether his "due process" rights are involved so as to
require a judicial type of notice and hearing where a license is involved
2
has been a source of great controversy and lack of clarity. s

As noted above, the award of a particular frequency to a particular
applicant is accomplished by the FCC through a licensing procedure.2 9
22. MACQUIVEY, note 17, at 190.
23. DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW 21 (1927).

24. See generally, FORKOSCHi, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 143-76 (1956). See, e.g., Schware
v. Board of Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
25. See generally, Philadelphia Co. v. SEC, 175 F.2d 808, 816-17 (D.C. Cir. 1948).

26. See BuRRus, note 16, at 50.
27. 3 ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW 635-714 (1958).
28. See Davis, The Requirement of Opportunity to be Heard in the Administrative
Process, 51 YALE L.J. 1093 (1942).
29. See generally, EDELMAN, THE LICENSING OF RADIO SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES,
1927 to 1947 (1950).
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The result is that constitutionally there is serious question whether a due
process right to notice and hearing is involved. 0
That constitutional hearing requirements may not obtain in the licensing of radio frequencies, however, does not mean that applicants are
without any procedural rights with respect to notice and hearing. The
APA includes licensing within adjudication for purposes of the applicability of the Act. Thus section 2(d) provides:
"Order" means the whole or any part of the final disposition
(whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in
form) of any agency in any matter other than rule making but
including licensing. "Adjudication" means agency process for
the formulation of an order. [Emphasis supplied.]
The result is that the formal hearing requirements provided by sections
5, 7, 8 and 11 apply to the assignments of frequencies to competing
applicants.
Section 5 of the Act provides that in "every case of adjudication required by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for
an agency hearing" (the FCC statute so provides), the hearing must be
in accordance with the provisions of sections 5, 7, 8, and 11.2 Section
5(a) requires notice to all interested parties. The notice is to include
"(1) the time, place, and nature thereof; (2) the legal authority and
jurisdiction under which the hearing is to be held; and (3) the matters
of fact and law asserted." Section 5(b) requires that interested parties
be given opportunity to present facts and arguments to the extent that
the nature of the proceeding and the public interest permit.
Section 5(c) provides for separation of functions in the hearing procedure. Justice Jackson of the Supreme Court has said that this was the
fundamental purpose of the Act, and the principal guarantee afforded
thereby to private parties. As he stated in Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath:
The Administrative Procedure Act did not go so far as
to require a complete separation of investigating and prosecuting functions from adjudicating functions. But that the safeguards it set up were intended to ameliorate the evil from the
commingling of functions as exemplified here is beyond doubt. 2
Thus, the section requires that "no officer shall consult any person or
party on any fact in issue unless upon notice and opportunity for all
parties to participate" (ex parte prohibition) and that "no officer . . .
engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions for
30.
31.
7 and 8
32.

DAVIS, ADmiNISTRATIVE LAW 139-42 (1959).

If rule-making is required to be based upon the record after hearing, sections
apply to it as well. See APA Section 4 (b).
339 U.S. 33 (1950).
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any agency in any case shall ...participate or advise in the decision ....
(internal separation of functions).
Section 7 details the hearing procedure, particularly requiring that
they be "conducted in an impartial manner'" and that decisions be based
exclusively upon the record taken. 4
Section 8 provides that decisions shall be made after the evidence is
taken, and that prior to any "recommended, initial, or tentative decision"
the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to submit for the
consideration of the officers participating in such decisions "(1) proposed
findings and conclusions, or (2) exceptions to the decisions or recommended decisions.., or to tentative agency decisions, and (3) supporting
reasons for such exceptions or proposed findings or conclusions."' 8 5
Section 11 provides for the independence of the hearing examiners
(the judges of the administrative hearings) and details the procedures
for their appointment, salary, assignment of cases, etc. Finally, section
10 provides for judicial review of final agency action, except so far as
statutes preclude review or agency action is by law committed to agency
discretion. Agency action may be set aside if it is found by the reviewing
court to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or not in accordance with law; if it is "without observance of procedure required by law";
or is unsupported by substantial evidence, considering the whole record.
In addition to the requirements of the APA, the Communications Act
of 1934, as amended, as well as the FCC Rules and Regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, contain many provisions with respect to the hearing procedures by which assignment decisions are to be made. The starting point is section 303 of the Act of 1934, as quoted above, i.e., where
the "public convenience, interest, or necessity requires," the Commission
shall "assign frequencies for each individual station and determine the
power which each station shall use and the time during which it may
operate." Assignments are accomplished by a licensing procedure. Section
307(a) provides: "The Commission, if public convenience, interest or
necessity will be served thereby, subject to the limitations of this Act,
shall grant to any applicant therefor a station license provided for by this
Act." Sections 307 through 314 then prescribe, in rather general terms,
the terms of the licenses (307), conditions in licenses for foreign communications (308), action upon applications and the form of and conditions
attached to licenses (309), special requirements with respect to certain
types of applications in broadcasting (311), administrative sanctions
(313), application of the antitrust laws (313), and preservation of competition in commerce (314). Sections 401 through 416 contain the pro33. Section 7(a).
34. Section 7(d).
35. Section 8(b).
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cedural and administrative provisions by which Commission action is
taken and enforced, and by which it may be contested.
As will be readily observed, the statutory provisions with respect to
licensing procedures whereby particular assignments are accomplished
are rather broad. Particularly is this true of the statutory standard by
which the award and renewal of such licenses is governed, i.e., "public
convenience, interest or necessity." As noted above, 6 the Supreme Court,
nevertheless, upheld the standard in 1933:
This criterion is not to be interpreted as setting up a
standard so indefinite as to confer an unlimited power .... The

requirement is to be interpreted by its context, by the nature of
radio transmission and reception, by the scope, character and
quality of services. 7
A later decision stated that the "criterion is as concrete as the complicated
factors for judgment in such a field [technically complicated and constantly changing] of delegated authority permit.""8
And, of course, the generality of the statute has been made more concrete by the enactment of various FCC Rules and Regulations. These
are too detailed to reproduce herein. The pertinent sections include the
following: Sections 0.441-0.453 (applications), sections 1.1-1.1119 (general rules of practice and procedure), and sections 2.100-2.603 (frequency
allocations and radio treaty matters). These rules, which govern the procedures whereby licensing decisions are made, are in general closely
modeled upon the APA requirements governing adjudication, but in some
instances reflect stricter legislative requirements relative to internal separation of functions in the FCC. Thus, the "Second McFarland Bill,"
which became law on July 16, 1952, requires the following:
The Commission shall establish a special staff of employees, hereinafter in this Act referred to as the "review staff,"
which shall consist of such legal engineering ... accounting and

other personnel as the Commission deems necessary. The review
staff shall be directly responsible to the Commission and shall
not be made a part of any bureau or divisional organization of
the Commission. Its work shall not be supervised or directed
by any employee of the Commission other than a member of the
review staff whom the Commission may designate as the head
of such staff. The review staff shall perform no duties or functions other than to assist the Commission, in cases of adjudication (as defined in the Administrative Procedure Act) which
36. Quotation in text at note 18.
37. Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Bros. Co., 289 U.S. 266, 285 (1933).
38 FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940).
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have been designated for hearing, by preparing a summary of
the evidence presented at any such hearing, but preparing, after
an initial decision but prior to oral argument, a compilation of
the facts material to the exceptions and replies thereto filed by
the parties, and by preparing for the Commission or any member or members thereof, without recommendations and in accordance with specific directions from the Commission or such
member or members, memoranda, opinions, decisions, and
orders .. .
It can therefore be seen that in accordance with the statutory mandates
of both the FCC and APA Acts, assignment to particular applicants is
accomplished by a judicialized procedure including notice, oral hearing,
right of counsel, right of confrontation, a decision upon the record, decision by an impartial tribunal, and right of appeal.
(4)

Comparative Hearings

Though characterized by well-defined procedures and guarantees with
respect to both rule-making and adjudication, the allocation and assignment of radio frequencies to civilian users is not without its problem
areas. The prime example involves the "comparative hearing" which the
FCC employs to adjudge competitive applications in broadcasting, i.e.,
two or more applicants for the same frequency. ° In such event, the
Commission utilizes one hearing at which each of the applicants makes
its respective arguments as to why it, rather than the others, should be
granted the license. On its face, the consolidated "comparative hearing"
would appear to be the most equitable and expeditious means of making
the decision. All the parties are before the Commission at one time, affording a ready basis for ascertaining the relative merits and demerits of
each, one with respect to the other.
The problem arises, however, with respect to the question of what
standard or standards the Commission will use to judge the applicants.
The most satisfactory process of judgment would appear to require some
objective standard to which the applicants may address their arguments
and according to which a decision may be made. In the absence of such
standard, a hearing could become a meaningless elevation of form over
substance from the point of view of the applicants, and eventuate in an
exercise of unbridled discretion on the part of the agency involved.,'
As noted above, the statutory standard to govern the Commission in
so adjudging between competing applicants is the "public convenience,
interest, or necessity." Though upheld by the Supreme Court as being as
39. 66 STAT. 713.
40. See generally, ED.LMAN, note 29 at 59-140.
41. See Schwartz, note 9 at 779.
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"econcrete as the complicated factors for judgment in such a field of delegated authority permit," 2 the standard is obviously quite vague. As
stated by one commentator, it is in fact no standard at all, but is4 3rather
like saying to the Commission, "Here is a problem, deal with it."

Over the years, the Commission has added substance to the general
standard by developing certain criteria to assist it in determining which,
if any, application is in the public interest. Some of the most important
comparative criteria are: (1) A preference for local ownership on the
theory that the local owner will have greater insight into local needs and is
more likely to obtain civic participation in programming. (2) A preference
for civil participation of the applicant and its principals on much the same
grounds. (3) As a lesser factor, a preference for diversification in the
occupational background of principals on the theory that this may produce more balanced programming. (4) Broadcast experience of the applicant or its principals. Good prior performance in broadcasting is viewed
as giving promise of good future performance. (5) A preference for integration of ownership with management on the theory that this tends to
assure effective action in carrying out program proposals. It is particularly significant when owner-managers have had prior broadcast experience. (6) The quality of program proposals, with a strong preference
for "balanced programming" (i.e., allotting a portion of the program time
to different types of programs, such as religion, agricultural, entertainment, education, etc.) and for "local live" programs (those on which
local talent perform, discuss, or participate with simultaneous telecast).
(7) The relative quality of proposed staff, studios, equipment and similar
factors. (8) A preference for applicants not affiliated with other media of
mass communications. Although this factor has a monopoly aspect, it is
viewed primarily as promoting the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse sources; like the other factors, it is a comparative
and not a disqualifying factor.44
With these criteria to refine the statutory standard, on the basis of
which decisions are to be made, applicants address themselves in their
briefs and arguments to each criterion as promulgated. Similarly, Commission decisions discuss them at great length prior to stating a result
which purports to be based on a weighing of the debits and credits accumulated by each of the applicants.
Unsuccessful applicants have often asserted that some of the criteria
are irrelevant or were improperly weighted in a given case, but the courts
have been reluctant to upset the Commission's application of the public
interest standard.4 5 In recent years, however, it has been frequently
42. Note 38.
43. DAVIS, ADMINsTRATrvE LAw 46 (1951).
44. GELLnORN & BYSE, PROBLEMS: ADMfINISTRATIVE LAW 2 (1960).
45. See Jaffe, The Scandal in TV Licensing, 215 Harper's Mag. 77, 84 (Sept. 1958).
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asserted that the Commission does not apply its criteria in a rational
fashion but instead resolves issues by "hunch, snap judgment, or call it
what you may."4 6 The Hoover Commission Report, from which the above
quotation is excerpted, also states:
Not a single person at the Commission who is concerned with
broadcast work will even pretend to demonstrate that the Commission's decision in these cases have followed a consistent
policy or, for that matter, any other policy than the desire 4to7
dispose of cases and, if possible, to do so by making grants.
One lawyer has stated that "comparative cases are resolved through an
arbitrary set of criteria whose application, if one judges from history, is
shaped to suit the cases of the moment."4 And a dissenting judge has
protested against the Commission's "employing shifting emphasis of comparative criteria obliterating any predictable pattern of decision.14 9
On the other hand, it has been stoutly maintained that the finger cannot rightly be pointed at the Commission alone. For the FCC has been
given precious little guidance by the Congress, which has deliberately
avoided spelling out meaningful standards even though apprised of the
dissatisfaction with the Commission's application of the guidelines which
it has worked out.5"
Thus, though the APA, the Communications Act of 1934, as amended,
and the FCC Rules and Regulations carefully -delineate guarantees of
a fair, open hearing to the various applicants for the limited frequency
space, problems remain. It is noteworthy, however, that these problems
are not in the area of fair procedure, but rather in the Commission's
attempt to create and then to apply substantive standards in deciding the
merits of cases.
B. Allocation and Assignment to Federal Government Users
(1) In General
As shown in Part I, FCC jurisdiction over the allocation and assignment of radio spectrum space does not extend to Federal Government
users. Section 305 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, confers authority in this latter regard upon the President. The President,
in turn, has by Executive Order delegated this responsibility to various
46. Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, Committee on Independent Regulatory Commissions, Staff Report on the Federal Communications Commission 11-40 (1948).
47. Id.
48. Report, Ad Hoc Advisory Committee on Allocation to the Senate Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong., Sess. 9 (1958).
49. Beachview Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC, 262 F.2d 688 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
50. See Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need for Better Definitions of Standards, 75 HARv. L.R. 863, 1055, 1263 (1962).
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executive officers. At present, by Executive Order 10995, the President's
function under section 305 is reposed in the Office of Emergency Planning. By virtue of the same executive order, the authority has been redelegated to the Director of Telecommunications Management. The functions to be performed by the Director, set out in section 2 of the Order,
are as follows:
(a) Coordinate telecommunications activities of the executive
branch of the Government and be responsible for the formulation, after consultation with appropriate agencies, of overall
policies and standards therefor. He shall promote and encourage
the adoption of uniform policies and standards by agencies
authorized to operate telecommunications systems. Agencies
shall consult with the Director of Telecommunications Management in the development of policies and standards for the conduct of their telecommunications activities within the overall
policies of the executive branch.
(b) Develop data with regard to United States Government
frequency requirements.
(c) Contract for studies and reports related to any aspect of
his responsibilities.
In performing these functions, the Director is to have the assistance of
the Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee (IRAC).
(2) IRAC
The history and present structure of IRAC were detailed in Part I.
Essentially, it is a Committee composed of users of federal frequency
space, whose function historically has been to accomplish voluntary coordination of radio-frequency use and the recommendation of assignments to be made by the President."' The Amended By-Laws detail the
duties and functions, organization, responsibilities of membership, IRAC
substructure, meetings and procedure, voting, and related matters.
As noted in Part I, the structure and responsibilities of IRAC have
changed from time to time depending upon Presidential decision as to
how to achieve the purposes of section 305 of the 1934 Act. In this connection, the recent directive of the Director of Telecommunications Management under whom IRAC now functions is pertinent in describing
IRAC's present organization of functions. 2
The directive, issued by Director of Telecommunications Management,
General O'Connell, indicates, first, the present constituency of IRAC,
i.e., a representative from each federal department and agency using
51. MACQuivEY, note 17 at 191.
52. Directive, Dated December 10, 1964.
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frequency space. These include: Agriculture, Air Force, Army, Commerce, Federal Aviation Agency, General Services Administration, Interior, Justice, National Aeronautics & Space Administration, Navy, State,
Treasury, and the U.S. Information Agency.
The functions specified for IRAC include maintaining "under continuing review the actual use of assigned frequencies by government agencies
to determine whether they are still required and are being used effectively
for the purpose for which they were obtained."53 IRAC is also directed
to
maintain, in collaboration with the FCC, continuing review of
the table of frequency allocations to ensure that the division
of the radio spectrum as between Federal Government and nongovernment [civilian] users serves the national interest; carry
on joint planning for use of the spectrum on a short-term and
long-term basis; recommend in the light of national security and
foreign relations, allocations for government use; 5 4and maintain the government table of frequency allocations.
Other directives to IRAC assign to it the task of recommending, in consultation with the FCC, national objectives in the allocation and use of
the radio frequency spectrum; recommending policies, criteria, technical
standards, regulations, etc., for acquisition and use of frequencies by
Federal Government agencies; executing policies and plans on frequency
management and use as directed by the Director of Telecommunications
Management; developing United States government radio frequency
requirements; effecting assignment of frequencies to Federal Government stations, "and [to] modify or revoke such assignments as appropriate," all subject to the approval of the Director; making technical
recommendations regarding frequencies proposed for use by foreign governments in Washington; and maintaining, in collaboration with the FCC,
plans for use of the spectrum in war emergency. Finally, IRAC is directed
to supervise notification to the International Telecommunications
Union/International Frequency Registration Board of frequency assignment to Federal Government users, designated as the coordination
agency, the use of frequencies in the prescribed U.S.-Canada border
zones; assist the Director of Telecommunications Management in formulating advice to the State Department regarding radio spectrum management, and assist the Director in carrying out national obligations within
its field of activity.55
Significantly, in the light of the numerous criticisms of IRAC catalogued in Part I, General O'Connell, referring to "both industry and
53. Industrial Communications Weekly News Service, January 15, 1965, p. 1.
54. Ibid.
55. Id. at 1-2.
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congressional criticism" of IRAC on the basis that it operates solely in

the benefit of individual agencies in their application for needed frequencies, said that he had concluded that IRAC "should be continued, should
be strengthened, and should be given a specific mission assignment by the
office." 56 As will be developed in Part III, however, the directive falls far
short of obviating all of the objections which have been leveled at Federal
Government allocation procedures.
Turning now to the specific assignment practices in the Federal Government sector, attention must again be directed to the IRAC By-Laws.
Specifically, Article X of the By-Laws states, ".

.

. any rules adopted by

the Committee shall be codified under the title 'Code of Administrative
Procedures,' which shall 'be maintained by the executive secretary." The
Frequency Assignment Subcommittee of the IRAC (Article VII) also
has a body of procedures which have been compiled in a rather informal
manner but are frequently employed for reference purposes during committee discussions. These procedures "have been accumulated from the
minutes and records of past actions by the IRAC and FAS."5 7
Once a federal agency has determined to its own satisfaction that it
needs a new or additional assignment and has selected the frequency it
wishes to use and has cleared the frequency both within the agency and
with other Federal Government users (though assigned, many frequencies
remain unused), it makes application to the Frequency Assignment Division (FAD) of IRAC. The application is then checked for accuracy and
completeness and sent on to the Frequency Assignment Subcommittee
(FAS) for consideration at its monthly meeting. If decision is impossible
within the Subcommittee, e.g., because of objection of the FAS representative of another Federal Government agency, the item is referred to
IRAC. If the matter cannot be resolved by IRAC, it is referred to the
Director of the Office of Telecommunications for guidance. This procedure, whereby representatives of Federal Government agencies which
use the frequency space decide among themselves on the distribution of
available frequencies, is in sharp contrast to the public hearings and justification procedures of civilian applicants before the FCC.
Particularly significant with regard to frequency management are such
items as the requirements for application justification. As described by
one commentator:
The requirements are quite broad and detailed, but in practice
when an application is being considered by the Subcommittee,
the requirement is assumed to be justified unless questioned by
a member of the Subcommittee. Especially the justification is
questioned when the application related to a frequency use
56. Id. at 1.
57. MACQUIVEY, note 17, at 192.

DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:1

which does not fit in with established past practice. An example
might be an application for an assignment to a military Government agency in a band
normally used only by non-Military
58
Government services.

The specifics of assignment terms and assignment review were described by the same author as follows:
Assignment terms. Methods of preparing applications are
covered in the FAS procedures. Also included are coordination
procedures with other countries and details relating to the provisions of different kinds of authorizations. These latter are usually indicated in the list of authorizations by means of coded
designators. Provisions for and extent of coordination with the
FCC are covered in the procedures.
There are a number of procedures in the FAS compilation
which relate to the manner in which frequency assignments will
be listed in the records of the committee and in the Executive
Order (E. 0.) formally assigning frequencies to Federal Government agencies. The date at which assignments are made by
the FAS is recorded in the records in a manner somewhat similar to that for recording dates in the International Frequency
Lists published by the International Telecommunication Union
(ITU). In the "E.O." only one date is recorded-that at which
the assignment is made.
Although an early assignment date may be used as one of a
number of arguments in the establishment of priority to use a
frequency in the event of interference, it is of value principally
as a key to the record of coordination as evidenced in the minutes of the committee and, if these records are not adequate,
further reference to records of coordination within each agency
concerned.
If an agency experiences interferences on one of its assignments, it may refer back to this coordination record to see what
statements were made at that time concerning operations in
being or planned by other agencies. If the interfering operation
was not mentioned at that time, then it is presumed that the
agency responsible for the more recent operation would make
the necessary adjustments to clear the interference.
Most fixed-service operations are assigned with specific identification of the transmitting and receiving locations. There is,
however, provision for assignment of 'group' operations involv58. Ibid. MAcQuIvEY. note 17, at 192.
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ing rather extensive low-power assignments not likely to cause
interference at great distances. These include military assignments for tactical and training purposes that are made in
a rather general nature to permit the maximum flexibility in'
actual operation. When 'group' assignments are made the
agency receiving the assignment undertakes to inform the committee of the specific fixed locations when they have been finally
determined.
Assignment review. Assignments made by the FAS and the
IRAC on a 'regular' basis are not subject to review under current procedures. There are, however, numerous. 'temporary' assignments and, most recently, a number of 'provisional' assign-,
ments. There are also a number of 'trial' assignments. The latter
(non-'regular') categories of assignments are subject to review
upon termination of the assignment. 'Temporary' assignments
are handled in much the same manner as 'regular' assignments.
Each temporary assignment that expires may be extended either
as a temporary or regular assignment upon decision of the committee based on the same kinds of factors as those affecting the
assignment initially. Provisional assignments are made to certain fixed operations in the appropriate frequency bands between 4 and 27.5 megacycles. They are made for a period of six
months. They become regular assignments upon activation of
the actual circuit.
If the circuit fixed is not activated within a six-months period,
then the committee reviews the need for the assignment and
may cancel or extend the authorization. Trial assignments are
made for a period of time estimated to be required, usually one,
three or six months. At the expiration of the trial period, or upon
the initiation of either of the agencies involved, the assignment
may be converted to a regular basis if the trial is satisfactory.
Determination of whether the trial has been satisfactory or not
is up to the agencies concerned and is based upon the nature and
extent of use of the operation during the trial period5 9
Thus, whereas the FCC assigns radio frequencies to civilian users by
means of a licensing operation for a limited period, IRAC makes some
frequency assignments to Federal Government agencies for an indefinite
period, others for a definite temporary period and still others for a trial
or provisional period which automatically becomes authorized for an
indefinite period upon the taking of certain actions by the immediate
agencies concerned.6" While civilian applicants must justify their appli59. Id. at 192-95.
60. Id. at 196.
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cation in accordance with the "public interest, convenience and necessity"
and the various criteria established by FCC rule or regulation in an open
hearing in which other users may voice their opinions on whether the
license should be issued, applications by Federal Government users to
IRAC are assumed to be justified unless questioned by a member of FAS,
i.e., a fellow Federal Government user. Whereas a comprehensive body
of rules governs the FCC licensing process, and a carefully formulated
body of rule-making procedures (including "notice" and "opportunity
to participate" to interested parties) relates to the formulation of such
rules, IRAC procedure operates rather by informal, changing, unpublished rules of practice which are really "terms of reference" rather than
governing rules.6 ' It should be added that there has been no material
change in this procedural structure in recent years despite the criticism
to which it has been subjected.
(3)

Requirement Determination, Selection and Clearance in User
Agencies
As noted above, IRAC is an inter-agency committee consisting of the
Federal Government users of radio spectrum space. As such it seeks to
coordinate various agency and department requests for frequencies
within the Federal Government allocation. The administrative process
by which assignments are made by IRAC, once agency requests have
been received, has just been described. The picture respecting frequency
management in the Federal Government sector would not be complete,
however, without some consideration of the administrative processes
relating to frequency assignments within the various agencies and departments themselves.
Internal agency procedures with respect to requirements determination, selection and clearance of desired frequency space vary widely
within the user agencies. Differences also exist with respect to the degree
of institutionalization of the procedures employed. Thus, some agencies
have very little by way of formalized guidance with respect to frequency decisions. At the other extreme is the Department of Agriculture
with a comprehensive set of regulations governing the internal procedures
by which requirements of the Department are determined and the means
whereby selection and clearance of a new frequency or modified use of
an old frequency are accomplished.62 Selected
portions of these regula63
tions appear in the Forest Service Manual.
The Manual elaborates the criteria for determination of frequency
requirements. Based on "public interest, convenience and necessity,"
it elaborates criteria for determining when high-frequency networks may
61. Id. at 192.
62. Id. at 121.
63. 3 FoREST SERVICE MANUAL, Title 13, Sec. K (rev. ed. 1951).
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be set up, when very-high frequency networks may be established, when
radio is to be used rather than telephone (as well as other restrictions on
use of radio to instances where other communication is inadequate),
equipment standards, economical use, sharing, duplication, group assignment of frequencies, how application for frequencies shall be made,
allocation of frequencies to regions, and restrictions on the power output
64
of transmitters.
In addition to the requirements in the Manual, the engineer in
charge of the Forest Service Communications Organization makes periodic visits to each regional headquarters and many sub-regional offices.
On these visits he assists the local officers in preparing their communications plans and in reviewing those which already have been made, from
the standpoint of justification and budget limitations.6 5 If a new "requirement" is necessary, review is made of existing assignments to the
Department of Agriculture to determine whether any of them can be
shared effectively. If not, then possible frequencies may be selected from
the E.O. (Federal Government) or the FCC Frequency List (if to be
shared with civilian users) within the desired band and taking into
account other listings on the same or adjacent frequencies. A telephone
call to the agencies concerned will then indicate any obvious conflicts.
If these hurdles are cleared, an application to the Frequency Assignment
Subcommittee (FAS) or IRAC for assignment of the frequency desired
66
is prepared.
Most of the criteria used in other agencies in making requirements
determinations may be compared in varying degrees with that used in
the Department of Agriculture. In most instances a large amount of local
freedom is allowed in determination of when a radio frequency is needed.
The decision lies almost entirely with the field commanders in the military services."
In the Civil Aeronautics Administration, frequency requirement determinations may originate in one of two ways. Inasmuch as the CAA
has undertaken to engineer frequency assignments for all radio aids to
air navigation, the indication of need to use a radio frequency for such
an aid by some other agency, e.g., the Air Force or Navy, would, of
course, originate with that agency. The other general source of stated frequency requirements originates with non-government airlines and airline
operating agencies. Since navigation aids must conform to various aeronautical regulations, those who wish to install such aids must come to the
CAA for assistance in determining what frequencies would be assigned.
64.
65.
66.
67.

MACQUmVY, note 17, at 149.
Id. at 129-30.
Id. at 170.
Id. at 149.

DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:1

The CAA itself is not in a position seriously to question the navigational
air requirements presented to it, except for those of its own stations. 68
With the exceptions noted above, federal agencies and departments
have very little by way of formal criteria for determination of radiofrequency requirements. As summarized by one commentator:
Each endeavors to fill any requirement received from the field
for which men, money and equipment are available as authorized by Congress through legislative and appropriations
authority.6 9
In addition to the determination of requirements, individual agencies
must be concerned with selection and clearance of a new frequency or
modified use of an old one. In this connection, each agency maintains
for itself lists of assignments and records of frequency usage of primary interest. In most instances, however, these lists contain only frequency assignments, not frequency usage.7"
These lists, as well as general lists such as the Radio Frequency Record
published by the International Telecommunication Union, the list of
Frequency Assignments to Federal Government Radio Stations and
Classes of Stations prepared by IRAC, and the list of licenses issued by
the FCC, comprise the tools used by the frequency assignment engineers
within each agency in making a selection of a frequency to comport with
new requirements. Because all the information is not available to all
such engineers, however, it is necessary for each to coordinate his plans
with those others likely to be affected. Most of the coordination is done
by telephone or in informal meetings of the engineers concerned. It is all,
however, formally confirmed in the regular monthly meetings of the
Frequency Assignment Subcommittee or IRAC. Discussion in the IRAC
may also be required in the event of unresolved controversy or if the proposed frequency use raises policy questions affecting future plans.7'
C. Coordinationbetween FederalGovernment and Civilian Use
Both the FCC and the IRAC employ the same frequency allocation
table. It is based on the International Allocation Table but with refinements within specific services and suballocation of certain bands between
Federal Government and civilian services. 72 From this common background, the two agencies assign frequencies to civilian and Federal Government stations. Inasmuch as the available space is limited and two separate agencies are making assignments from it, coordination is imperative
if the public interest is to be achieved.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

134-139.
150.
181.
182.

72. MAcQuVrEY, note 17, at 196.
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Notable in regard to the coordination process which has been worked
out between the two agencies is an ACC/IRAC coordination agreement
approved by the IRAC on October 3, 1940. The agreement was reconfirmed on November 5, 1953. It provides as follows:
The Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee will cooperate with the Federal Communications Commission in giving notice of all proposed actions which would tend to cause
interference to non-Government [civilian] station operation,
and the Federal Communications Commission will cooperate
with the Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee in giving
notice of all proposed actions which would tend to cause interference to Federal Government station operation. Such notification will be given in time for the other agency to comment
prior to final action. Final action by either agency will not, however, require approval by the other agency.
The two agencies will maintain up-to-date lists of their respective authorized transmitting frequency assignments.7"
The current practice with respect to coordination of assignment
activities between IRAC and the FCC is described in a Memorandum
from the Director of Telecommunications Management, Frequency
Management Division, dated March 24, 1964. Interestingly, the memorandum concludes:
The dual Presidential/FCC authority over the use of the
radio frequency spectrum would seem to invite confusion, inefficiency and interference. However, years of close working
relationship between the IRAC and FCC Liaison Representative to the IRAC have made it the rule to avoid trouble and to
put the United States in the lead in the preparation for and
work in international telecommunication conferences.
That open war does not exist between the FCC and IRAC, however,
does not suggest that there exists a coordinated system of frequency
allocation and assignment which is in the public interest. In this connection, the colloquy between Representative Moss and then FCC Chairman
Doerfer, reprinted in Part I," at the 1959 Hearings, will be recalled. In
effect, Mr. Doerfer admitted that the FCC gave up civilian allocations
to Federal Government agencies "just on the mere representation that
...
(the FCC) should do it," since no hearings or justifications were required to demonstrate paramount need in the Federal Government
agency requesting the frequency change.7" More will be said about this
in Part III.
73. Quoted in MACQUIVEY, note 17, at 196-97.
74. P. 68.
75. Part I, pp. 60-62.
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As has been stated previously, both the FCC and the IRAC use the
same Allocation Table. The Table is divided between the Federal Government allocations, allocations to civilian users, and shared-use allocations. Occasionally, of course, as needs have changed, the Table has had
to be altered accordingly. The major changes since the Atlantic City
Radio Conference of 1947, occurred in 1958 and 1961. The reasons for
these changes, as well as the manner in which IRAC and the FCC worked
together to accomplish them, described in a memorandum from the Director of Telecommunications Management, Frequency Management Division, dated May 15, 1964, are not of immediate relevance to our present
discussion.
III. EVALUATION OF PRESENT SYSTEM IN TERMS OF THE
PUBLIC INTEREST
The purpose of this Part is to evaluate the dual system of allocation
management described in Parts I and II. With the growing shortage of
spectrum space created by increasing demands upon a finite natural
resource, it is imperative that the management scheme be so structured
as to accomplish the most efficient, effective and equitable system of
distribution and control of frequencies as can be accomplished in the
public interest. The current system falls far short of achieving this
objective.
As has been shown, government management of allocation and assignment practices is presently bifurcated. The Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) is charged with the responsibility for the assignment
and regulation of frequencies utilized by civilian users, whereas the
President is responsible for the allocation of frequencies to Federal Government users. This latter responsibility the President has delegated to
the Director of Telecommunications Management with the assistance of
the Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee (IRAC).'
The deficiencies which inhere in the present system of dual management and control may be summarized as follows:
(1) Dual control by its very nature generates difficulties with respect to allocation and assignment of limited frequency space in the
public interest.
(2) The practices for determining when an assignment will be
made within the two spheres, Federal Government and civilian use, differ
widely. Suspicion and mistrust are inevitable when civilian users are subject to strict FCC justification procedures while lack of true justification
procedures or objective determinations of need prevail with respect to
Federal Government allocations under IRAC procedures. These easier
1. Text as note 1, Part II. The prior situation was described in detail in Part I.
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procedures of IRAC mean that more Federal Government assignments
are made than if an objective analysis of asserted need had been made,
which in turn puts greater pressure upon civilian uses.
(3) While the absence of centralized control under the present system could, theoretically at least, result in frequency wars, with both the
FCC and IRAC assigning the same frequency to a civilian and Federal
Governmental user respectively, in actuality this is avoided, but only because there is submergence of the public interest in civilian use to that
of the Federal Government use, accomplished through FCC subservience
to demands by Federal Government users.
(4) The combination of factors (2) and (3) above means that a
basically unevaluated, asserted Federal Governmental need is served to
the detriment of civilian use and public interest. This is in consequence
of the lack of real evaluation of the asserted Federal Government need
and the lack of a comparative evaluation, in the public interest, between
the asserted Federal Government need and the civilian need.
(5) To these deficiencies must be added the general lack of meaningful, long-range planning in the use of the spectrum.
These deficiencies will now be considered in turn.
It is evident that for a dual system of management and control to work
effectively, there must be a procedure for coordination of efforts and
resolution of conflicts. It is noteworthy that there is no statutory directive with respect to coordination between the Federal Government and
civilian spheres. As shown in Part I, the Communications Act confers
authority for regulation and control of the radio spectrum upon the FCC,
and then in sections 305 and 606 excepts assignments to Federal Government users. This latter responsibility is, by these sections, placed in
the President.
Neither is there any Presidential guidance respecting coordination of
FCC and IRAC management activities. Executive Order 10995 delegates
Presidential authority for assignments in the Federal Government sphere
to the Director of Telecommunications Management with the assistance
of IRAC. Neither the Director nor IRAC, however, is directed to coordinate its activities with FCC management in the civilian sphere, nor
is there suggested any scheme for the resolution of conflicts. In fact, the
FCC is mentioned only -three times in the Order: i.e., in sections 3(b),
7 and 8. Section 3(b), after conferring authority upon the Director with
respect to foreign radio stations, provides: "Authorization for the construction and operation of a radio station pursuant to this subsection
and the assignment of a frequency for its use shall be made only upon
recommendation of the Secretary of State and after consultation with
the Attorney General and the Chairman of the Federal Communications
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Commission." Section 7 provides, "Nothing contained in this order shall
be deemed to impair any existing authority or jurisdiction of the Federal
Communications Commission." Finally, section 8 provides, "The Director
of Telecommunications Management and the Federal Communications
Commission shall assist and give policy advice to the Department of
State in the discharge of its functions in the field of international telecommunications policies, positions and negotiations." Thus, with the
exception of Federal Government radio stations at the seat of government
and international telecommunications generally, there is neither legislative nor executive direction with respect to coordinated efforts in the
allocation and assignment of frequencies by the FCC and IRAC.
Necessity, of course, has dictated some degree of coordination between
the FCC and IRAC. There is only one spectrum; the same frequency
cannot be used at the same time by a civilian and a Federal Government
user. In this respect, the FCC/IRAC coordination agreement of October
3, 1940 (reconfirmed on November 5, 1953) is significant. As earlier
noted,2 it requires the two organizations to notify each other of proposed
actions which might cause "interference," so that each might make comments to the other prior to final action, but it also specifically states
that "Final action by either agency will not, however, require approval
by the other agency."
The specifics of the informal coordination procedures worked out by
the two agencies is described in a memorandum from the Director of
Telecommunications Management, Frequency Management Division,
dated March 24, 1964. Essentially, the coordination procedure consists
of FCC appointment of one of its members as Liaison Representative to
IRAC, exchange by the FCC and IRAC of applications by civilian and
Federal Government users or applicants respectively, and meetings between the two agencies to work out any conflicts between civilian and
Federal Government usage. The memorandum concludes:
The dual Presidential/FCC authority over the use of the
radio frequency spectrum would seem to invite confusion, inefficiency and interference. However, years of close working
relationship between the IRAC and FCC Liaison Representative to the IRAC have made it the rule to avoid trouble and to
put the United States in the lead in the preparation for and
work in international telecommunication conferences.
That "trouble" has been avoided, however, is not to suggest that
the most efficient, effective and equitable system of distribution and
control of frequencies has been accomplished in the public interest. Moreover, while "trouble" has been avoided in the sense that no complete
2. Quoted in MACQUIVEY, FREQUENCY ASSIGNMENT ADMINISTRATIVE

(1956).

CONTROL 196-97
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breakdown has occurred in frequency assignments between Federal Government and civilian use, this does not signify the absence of friction or
difficulty in frequency assignment and related activities. As has been
shown, there is presently no formalized procedure for the resolution of
competing frequency demands of civilian and Federal Government users.
Indeed, not only is there no one person or agency with overriding
authority to assess competing demands between the two spheres and
make such award as the public interest dictates, there are not even legislative or executive standards or directions to be employed by the FCC
and IRAC in resolving conflicts with respect to competing applicants.
As concluded in the 1960 Report of the Library of Congress for thenSenator Lyndon Johnson's Committee on Aeronautical and Space
Sciences:
With respect to national policy, none has yet been formulated
and adopted which clarifies the dual control of the radio frequency spectrum by the FCC and the IRAC ...no criteria have

been established between the conflicting needs of [Federal]
government and non-government [civilian] users . .

. Just

as the United States lacks a clear policy for dividing the spectrum among its own users, so it lacks a policy for guidance
the national position for international negotiain preparing
3
tions.

The result of this is that "allocations . . .(are) made by officials who
.. . (can) not weigh all demands for spectrum space, [Federal] gov-

ernment and private (civilian) and judge them impartially on the basis
of full explanation according to a single set of standards and a wellconsidered policy."4 The FCC allocates and regulates within the civilian
sphere. IRAC services frequency demands by Federal Government
users. In the event of civilian and Federal Government application for
the same space, the two agencies merely work it out among themselves
by means of the informal procedures described above. In other words,
instead of having a management structure which assigns the available
supply of frequencies among all claimants in accordance with a judgment
as to how best the public interest might be served, the claims of Federal
Government use are "negotiated" between the President's designated
agent and the FCC rather than subjected to comparative examination
with other competing users in an effort to determine wherein lies the
public interest.
Not only is there no objective analysis and decision concerning the
competing demands of Federal Government and civilian users, but the
3. Quoting Loeber's, Regulations and Administration of Telecommunications
United States (p. 92 of the Report).
4. President's Communications Policy Board, Report (1951).

in the
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two users operate "under different ground rules." As stated by Mr.
Fellows of the National Association of Broadcasters in the 1959 Hearings
on Spectrum Allocation:
The basic problem, here, lies in the fact that there are two
users of vital spectrum space-[Federal] Government and nonGovernment [civilian]-with each of them operating under
different ground rules.
The non-Government [civilian] users of the spectrum must
justify to the Federal Communications Commission in public
proceedings their need for and utilization of the portions of the
spectrum which may be allocated to their particular services.
However, although the non-Government civilian users present
information of use and justification for what they request in
the spectrum, similiar information is not submitted with respect
to the [Federal] Government use of the spectrum which might
indicate how the entire natural resource could best be utilized.
The [Federal] Government users are not required to justify
before Congress, public opinion, or any impartial body, their
use of frequencies. 5
If a Federal Government agency need not justify its demand to anyone
(not even to IRAC), no assessment may be made as to whether the
public interest would best be served by assignment to the Federal Government applicant rather than a prospective civilian user, even assuming,
contrary to fact, that there existed an assessment procedure.
That suspicion and mistrust are bound to result from the fact that
the FCC and IRAC use different ground rules for deciding upon allocation and assignment requests is indicated in the following statement by
Dr. Irving Stewart, who had been Chairman of the President's Communications Policy Board:
In other words, Mr. Chairman, this situation is one which
is made to order for suspicion, and there is every reason to believe that the suspicion does exist. Every service [Federal]
Government or non-Government [civilian] is convinced of the
importance of its mission.
It is natural for each [Federal] Government department to
emphasize the importance of its role; and there isn't inherent
in the situation any necessary motivation to conserve frequencies in order that they might be available for non-Government
[civilian] use. In many cases in the assignment of frequencies,
5. Hearings, Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce
of the House of Representatives, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., June 8, 9, 1959, p. 36.
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security considerations must be taken into account, and that
means that justifications for the assignments cannot be made
a matter of record.
And then when you have no public record, you have another
fertile ground for suspicion. Perhaps the assignment was justified but it is going to be pretty hard to convince the man who
loses out that it was justified.'
A further consequence of the present system of dual control is that
"the (Communications) Act places the Commission under no duty to
respect the President's assignment; either the Commission or the President could start a radio war by assigning a frequency already in use to an
interfering user." 7 This could be the case where, under section 305, a
Federal Government station is transmitting Federal Government business over its frequency.
That no such wars have actually occurred suggests no merit in the
present system, however. In fact, the absence of radio wars is attributable
to FCC subservience to IRAC decisions,' which emphasizes the inconsistency of the present system in the service of the public interest. For
if the FCC merely submits to any request by a Federal Government
agency, then the informal negotiation procedures described above,
whereby IRAC and the FCC "adjust" competing demands, amounts
to a coordinated effort in the public interest only if it can be said that
every frequency demand by a Federal Government agency is automatically more in the public interest than a request for the same frequency
by a civilian applicant.
The tremendously significant contributions of civilian users, for example, in the field of experimentation in aeronautical radionavigation,9
render such a priori conclusion impossible. The point is simply that an
asserted (Federal Government) interest is not necessarily "the public
interest."
That FCC subservience is, in fact, the means of "avoiding trouble"
under the present system of dual control was made abundantly clear in
the colloquy between Representative Moss and the then-Chairman of the
FCC, Mr. Doerfer, at the 1959 Spectrum Allocation Hearings: 1
The Chairman. Is it not a fact that right now OCDM has
asked the Federal Communications Commission to give up
6. Id. at 33-35.
7. Report of the President's Communications Policy Board, note 4, at 193-94.
8. Id. at 194-95.
9. This was involved in the Bendix Litigation. See Bendix Aviation Corp. v. FCC, 272
F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied sub nom. Aeronautical Radio, Inc. v. United
States, 361 U.S. 965 (1960).
10. Hearings, note 5, at 87-88.
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aviation channels, 8500 megacycles, for [Federal] Government
use, and the Commission has done so, solely on your statement.
Is that true?
Mr. Doerfer. That is correct.
The Chairman. And also it is not a fact that on that action
there is litigation pending at the moment?
Mr. Doerfer. That is right.
The Chairman. There is the example, Mr. Moss.
Mr. Doerfer. There is no litigation between the Federal Communications Commission and the Office of Civil Defense.
Mr. Moss. And the Federal Communications Commission,
having great confidence in the OCDM, accommodated them?
Mr. Doerfer. On the basis that the OCDM was responsible
for the national security to a much closer and greater extent
than we are, and we were in position to do that with respect to
that.
So that, when they indicated that they wanted that, we could
not find any specific authority in the act whereby we could
say no. We did the other thing.
Mr. Moss. Is there any specific authority in the act that
makes that possible for them?
Mr. Doerfer. No, other than when you say "they," I have
in mind the President. OCDM is asking for the President.
Mr. Moss. I think this gets to a rather important question,
Mr. Chairman:
That you give up something to another [Federal] Government agency, just on the mere representation that you should
do it. You have not had a hearing which would enable you to
determine whether the request is a proper one or not; whether,
in fact, the security of the Nation is involved. As you probably know, for 4 years I have spent some time on another
committee where I have had Government witnesses say that
security is involved here, and I have found that the security was
so remote and nebulous that it would be almost impossible to
identify it.
There is no one here on behalf of the communications agencies to say, or to determine whether or not the [Federal] Government agency is making a valid case, whether there is a com-
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pelling [Federal] Government requirement for the channels
it has requested.
Mr. Doerfer. I think that is a correct statement.
Further, FCC subservience has been judicially sanctioned as illustrated in the Bendix1 litigation discussed in Part I, which was the
litigation referred to in the above-quoted colloquy. In that case, the FCC
had turned down petitions for rehearing on a ruling that the 8500-9000
Mc/s frequency, previously a shared use for radionavigation between
Federal Government and civilian, be thereafter allocated to exclusive
Federal Government use for radio positioning. The petitions were denied
on the ground (stated in FCC Order 58-745) that "the OCDM has
informed the Commission that the granting of the requests in the various petitions for reconsideration would have a serious effect on national
defense capabilities."
The Court's opinion, quoted at length in Part I, although admitting
the conflict between Federal Government and "important" civilian demands and the possibilities of abuse inherent in the present management
structure, nonetheless held that commission subservience was not
unlawful.
We have mentioned the contrast between FCC and IRAC procedures. 2
It is helpful here to summarize these differences because the impact of
these procedures upon the division of the spectrum between the two uses
is very important. First, it is noteworthy that allocation and assignment
of civilian frequency space is the responsibility of a bipartisan, independent agency of the Federal Government. The agency is formally
created by statute and the procedures, whereby its allocation decisions
are made, are well-defined in the enabling act, as well as in rules and
regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, and in the Administrative
Procedure Act. Through the licensing mechanism, and provisions for
periodic renewal and for suspension and revocation in the event of
abuse, the Commission is in a position to exercise continuing control
over frequency usage in the private sphere.'- Further, various provisions
prohibiting ex parte influence and requiring a decision on the record
go a long way toward insuring a decision in the public interest. 4
Second, individual applicants for frequency space are accorded the
burden of establishing justification for the space requested, i.e., the burden of showing that one applicant rather than another would better
achieve the public interest is placed upon the applicant himself. Competing applicants then meet in an open comparative hearing in which
11.
12.
13.
14.

272 F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
See Part II.
See Sections 307-314, 401-416 of the Communications Act of 1934.
E.g., Administrative Procedure Act, Section 5(c).
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evidence is taken from all, with each knowing the claims, promises, etc.,
of his competitor. Upon the basis of this evidence, the Commission
makes its decision as to which it thinks would best achieve the public
interest, convenience and necessity.'5
Third, the periodic renewal requirements and general supervisory
powers of the Commission prevent a hoarding of frequencies upon the
theory that they might be of some use to a licensee at a later date.
Fourth, frequency allocation and assignment by the FCC is characterized by public procedures and written opinions setting forth findings,
reasons and opinions underlying decisions.' 6 FCC procedures do not
partake of the deficiency described by Senator Long of the Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Procedure:
Too much of the public business is being conducted in virtual
secrecy.... The public has only the most superficial knowledge
of what government policy is on some vital issues, how arrived
at, who is responsible for them, and other matters of comparable importance.'
Secret and publicly unjustified decisions by agencies with authority
to develop basic policies affecting, or to determine allocations of, public
resources are inconsistent with the public interest in curtailing opportunities for arbitrary governmental action.' As was indicated in Part II,
FCC procedure presently avoids the problem with respect to assignments in the civilian sector. Notice, hearing, confrontation, cross-examination, right to counsel, impartial tribunal, and a decision on the
record-the traditional requisites of open decision-making--characterize
FCC assignment practice.
This is not to suggest, of course, that no problems inhere in the
assignment of frequencies to civilian users. Principal among these are
the "shifting emphasis of comparative criteria"'" employed by the Commission in making decisions in comparative licensing cases and FCC
subservience to requests by Federal Government agencies for contested
frequency space. It is noteworthy, however, that with regard to the first
problem, the difficulty is not in the area of fair procedure, but rather in
the Commission's application of substantive standards in deciding the
merits of cases. And, with regard to the second, the problem is not one
15. See Part II, A. (4).
16. As to the problems generally, see GELLHORN & BYSE ADrmIsTRAnvx LAW 1073,
et seq (1960).
17. See Report of the Committee on the Judiciary of the U.S. Senate, pursuant to
S. Res. 261, 88th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1965).
18. See Hector, Government by Anonymity, Who Writes Our Regulatory Opinions?,
45 Am.B.J. 1260 (1959).
19. Beachview Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC, 262 F.2d 688 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
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of the Commission's making, but is rather the result of the dual system
of management itself without the benefit of any institutionalized procedure for guaranteeing allocation decisions in the public interest.
The four above-described characteristics of FCC assignment practice
in the civilian sphere stand in marked contrast to the practice of IRAC,
as supervised by the Director of Telecommunications Management, in
assigning frequency space to Federal Government users.
First, in contrast to the FCC, which is an independent regulatory
agency of the Federal Government, IRAC is an inter-agency committee
composed of representatives of user federal agencies. As the President's
Communications Policy Board observed: "The key to the matter is the
nature of the group-a group of users, rather than an independent judging body ....

[No] body of users acting as judge of its requirements

can take an impartial view of the requests of its members."" Dr. Irving
Stewart, who had been Chairman of the PCPB, amplified this observation in his testimony at the 1959 Hearings. Thus:
• . . But when you come to the other side of the picture, the
[Federal] Government side, you have the ultimate authority in
the President of the United States as Commander in Chief, and
also exercising certain authority conferred in the Communications Act of 1934. Now the President of the United States, according to popular report, has other things to do than spend
his full time in managing the radio side of the spectrum, the
[Federal] Government side, so that tends to get pushed down.
One of the convenient devices for handling the situation that
results is IRAC, the International Departmental Radio Advisory Committee to which the chairman referred earlier.
That is an extremely useful technical body, but it is a body
composed of users. The situation is one in which naturally
there is a desire to accommodate the wishes of the users who
participate. There is nobody sitting in the position of arbiter.
There is nobody who can ask too many hard questions. There
is nobody who has an overriding task of requiring that the necessity for a particular new assignment be established in the
21
light of all the assignments that have been made in the past.
With no one to ask "the hard questions," the result has been a logrolling type of operation or, as described by Mr. Fellows in the 1959
Hearings, a "see saw of determining who gets what portions, and who
is using the domain efficiently."' Finally, the testimony of Mr. Victor
20. Report of President's Communications Policy Board, note 4, at 200.
21. Hearings, note 5, at 33-35.
22. Id. at 36-38.
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Cooley, who had been Chairman of the Special Committee on Telecommunications, is worthy of repeating in this respect:
On the other hand, on the [Federal] Government side we don't
find sudh a thorough and business like approach to the question
of assignment because there is no authoritative voice any place
in the Government except the President, or the Director of the
Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization acting for the President who may resolve a controversy or say how [Federal]
Government frequencies shall be assigned. Now IRAC is a committee of representatives of agencies involved in the usage of
radio frequencies, and they are very competent people.
They understand the use of the spectrum, but as has been
pointed out, there is no one on IRAC that has any authority

whatever to say that the Defense Department request shall
prevail-for instance, if Defense wants something and if Commerce wants the same thing, or if some other agency is interested in the same frequency, there is no one that can say,
after hearing all facts, 'This frequency should go to Defense
or that frequency should go to Commerce.'
But a lot of it has been through compromise and trading back
and forth, not because any group or board with authority to
handle such things has decided after full examination that this
frequency should go here or this one should go there. That is
the main thing that I should say, the main conclusion that our
committee came to, that there should be on the [Federal]
Government's side the kind of examination and study and
evaluation of frequency assignments with an authoritative
voice acting on behalf of the President to make these assignments that prevail on the non-Government [civilian] side.
. . . whereas the FCC decides in an authoritative evaluated

way whether or not an assignment should be made to this applicant or that applicant there is no one that does that on the
[Federal] Government's side. On the [Federal] Government's
side if Navy, for instance, needs a particular frequency and the
Air Force say they need the same frequency although they
start out wanting the same frequency, they can probably by
compromise decide that maybe another frequency will do for
Navy or Air Force can get along with a different one.23
It should be apparent that a procedure whereby allocation decisions
are determined by "compromise," by "log-rolling," or by a "see saw" type
23. Id. at 49-50, 52.
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of operation among the users, is far from conducive to insuring the
most effective, efficient and equitable distribution of frequency space,
even within the Federal Government sector.
In the second place, in contrast to the extensive and well-defined
justification procedures employed by the FCC in making assignments to
civilian users, no such practices persist respecting allocations in the
Federal Government sphere. Without a procedure whereby applicants
justify their proposed use in terms of the public interest," i.e., where
requests are granted upon the bare assertion of need, there is no basis
for assessing comparative needs in the light of the public interest.
Despite this fact, Federal Government allocations are not conditioned
upon justification. As stated by Mr. Fellows in the 1959 Hearings:
However, although the non-Government [civilian] users
present information of use and justification for what they request in the spectrum, simliar information is not submitted
with respect to the Federal Government use of the spectrum
which might indicate how the entire natural resource could best
be utilized. The Federal Government users are not required to
justify before Congress, public opinion, or any impartial body,
their use of frequencies. 4
To a similar effect was the statement of the President's Communications Board: "IRAC does not require sufficient justification for the assignment of frequencies, has no authority to question any [Federal]
government department's statement of need for a frequency, and is not
constituted to do so.125
Third, in contrast to the continuing supervisory powers of the FCC
over civilian licensees, no formalized control exists with respect to
checking Federal Governmental usage and guarding against hoarding
and non-use. The President's Communications Policy Board was especially critical of Federal Government allocation practice in this regard, commenting that IRAC contained no power to "transfer . . .
frequencies when -the original assignees failed to utilize them. '26 Congressional criticism has also been directed toward IRAC in this regard.
Illustrative is the inquiry of Senator Potter on March 25, 1957, discussed in Part .2"
That the fears of hoarding of frequency space against the contingency
of future use is, in fact, justified is evident from the testimony of General Quesada, who was personally concerned with spectrum allocation
24. Hearings, note 5, at 36.
25. Report of President's Communications Policy Board, note 4, at 30.
26. Id. at 199.

27. See note 117 of Part I, and accompanying text.
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on the Federal Government side for some twenty years. In the 1959
Hearings, General Quesada stated:
The problem of allocating and assigning frequencies is a very,
very complex problem wherein you are dealing with vested
interests and in this regard I might cite my own experience
which goes back about 20 years ....
Now I must say to you in all sincerity that my memory
searching back over the 20 years tells me that in practically
every case I was subjective and not objective. I was a contestant.
I hoped for a status quo, at least a status quo in respect to what
I had. I often sought what somebody else had, and this is
characteristic not only of me, but of practically everybody who
has ever been involved in this problem. It is an occupational
disease, if I may refer to it as such. It is a frailty of human
nature, also.
Now it isn't uncommon for a person, and I have to say perhaps I have been guilty of this, to harbor my frequencies or to
harbor an assignment of frequencies even to the point of denying data and information as to their use. It isn't uncommon
to generate use when a frequency is challenged....
There are 12 members of IRAC. Each member is a contestant, as is my agency (the Federal Aviation Agency)-very
often a contestant with and against other members. Under
those circumstances I doubt the ability of any member to be
really objective. I doubt very seriously. Again if this is 28
the case,
I would attribute it to the frailties of human nature.
With the various Federal Government agencies regarding themselves
as "contestants," and without any independent decision-making body to
decide between contestants, the tendency to hoard against future needs
when there might be a frequency shortage becomes inevitable. Once
again the public interest in the most effective, efficient and equitable
distribution of limited frequency space must suffer.
Finally, whereas FCC assignment practice is characterized by public
decision-making with ample notice, open hearings, confrontation, crossexamination, right of counsel, an impartial tribunal and a decision on the
record, the IRAC in assigning frequencies to Federal Government users
follows no such practice. There are no public hearings, no rules or
opinions are published, no industry or public participation is permitted,
and there are no procedures for appeal. IRAC's decision-makers combine
the roles of petitioner, judge
and jury. Practices like these hardly accord
29
with democratic theory.
28. Hearings, note 5, at 196-97.

29. Report of President's Communications Policy Board, note 4, at 197-200.
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Secret decision-making is decision-making outside the critical scrutiny
of the public view. Without this check-vital in avoiding arbitrary government-a crucial guarantee of decision-making in the public interest
is lost; there is no basis or record upon which to call the decision-maker
to task for an erroneous decision. The public interest in the most effective, efficient, and equitable utilization of limited frequency space
must once again suffer. Furthermore, basic ideas concerning fairness to
applicants are jeopardized since, "when you have no public record, you
have [a] . . .fertile ground for suspicion. Perhaps the assignment was

justified but it is going to be pretty hard to convince the man who loses
out that it was justified.""0
The importance of this fundamentally non-adversary, unanimous
agreement-among-users process of assignment of frequencies among
Federal Government agencies to the problem we are considering-the
division of the spectrum between Federal Government and civilian users
-is in its adverse effect upon the civilian user and to the public interest
in having the most efficient and effective utilization of the spectrum.
We have seen that when the IRAC and Director of Telecommunications
Management make demands upon the FCC in "negotiations," the FCC
has uniformly given ground to claims that "national security" requires
frequency allocation to Federal Government rather than civilian use.
These two factors then-relative ease in securing IRAC assignments
because no searching inquiry into need is made, and FCC subservience
to requests for frequencies otherwise available to civilian users-in combination mean that the total spectrum space available to the civilian user
is being diminished without an objective critical analysis of the asserted
Federal Government need for the frequencies at any stage. Hence, the
lack of adequate procedures within the Federal Government sphere not
only minimizes efficient use of the spectrum within that sphere, but results in taking from the civilian user otherwise available frequencies in
order to serve a Federal Government need which is essentially unevaluated objectively in its own terms.
Even if there could be created a more effective procedure within the
Federal Government by which asserted needs for frequencies by Federal
Government agencies would be subjected to objective and critical evaluation to insure that there is real need and that there is full and effective
use and not hoarding, the problem of comparative assessment of need
with justified civilian use would remain unsolved as a result of this improvement. For while an internal Federal Government justification procedure would likely reduce the number of requests for diversion of
frequencies from civilian use-some requests could be expected to be
withdrawn or turned down in the internal Federal Governmental ex30. Hearings, note 5, at 33-35.
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amination which we are supposing might be created-it would in no
sense furnish a comparative evaluation of that Federal Governmental
need and the competing civilian need, in order that a judgment concerning allocation of frequency in the public interest could be made.
Finally, the present system of dual control is deficient in its failure
to afford the means for any coherent policy-planning with respect to allocation needs and usages in the future. As the President's Communications
Policy Board commented:
There has been no long-range study of the question, no longrange planning. No agency of government is in a position to
take a comprehensive view of this problem. No agency is qualified to advise the President in fields where the interests of private [civilian] and [Federal] government telecommunications
users are in conflict. Meanwhile in the absence of guiding.
policy, the action of government agencies could seriously handicap the industry.
[D]ual control [by IRAS and FCC] has led to friction, misunderstanding, waste, and avoidance of responsibility. The organization is lacking in over-all policy guidance, and so complex
that few persons understand all its ramifications.
The present telecommunications legislation and organization
have failed to produce adequate direction, leadership, administration, and control and have fostered dissention between the
federal government and industry. Many of these shortcomings
could have been mitigated if not avoided.
Exploitation of the spectrum is not static but is fluid, increasing
with the cooperation and good will of users, improvements in
equipment, operating techniques, circuit discipline, need, and
willingness to accept a poorer grade of service when necessary.
It is not likely that the improvements derived' from these
measures will keep pace with the demands unless energetic
steps are taken to establish an agency competent to assure the
best circuit discipline, equitable allocation of frequency channels, and full use of technical developments."
Yet, the fact of "scarcity of radio frequencies in relation to the steadily
growing demand"" requires just the sort of policy-planning which the
present system of dual control, with each part operating under different
procedures and with conflict avoided by subservience of one part to
the other, does not permit.
31. Report of President's Communications Policy Board, note 4, at 46-50.
32. Statement of President Truman, quoted in Hearings, note 5, at 23.
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Part IV of this study will set forth our recommendations for remedying these deficiencies of the existing system of dual control of the
spectrum.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REMEDYING DEFICIENCIES
OF THE PRESENT ALLOCATION SYSTEM
The foregoing description and evaluation of the system employed
to allocate frequencies between Federal Government and civilian use,
so as to serve the public interest in securing the most effective utilization
of the spectrum, has disclosed basic defects which are antagonistic to
that public interest and urgently need corrective action.
First, there is no objective decision-making body, whether an institution or a designated individual, to determine in the overall public interest
the allocation of frequencies as between these competing claims for use.
Rather, there are two agencies, the FCC and the DTM-IRAC, with
split responsibilities, who "negotiate" disputes over allocation, with
the FCC in fact being subservient to DTM-IRAC demands for allocation of frequencies to Federal Government use.
Second, even assuming that such an objective decision-making body
is established, there are no organized and meaningful procedures now in
existence by which a rational decision among competing Federal Government and civilian requests for allocation may best be arrived at.
Our recommendations are designed to remedy these defects. Broadly,
our first recommendation is that one institution should be given the task
of determining, in the public interest, allocation of frequencies as between
all competing claims for use. The second recommendation is that this be
done in a manner which closely resembles the rule-making procedures
of the APA and the major federal regulatory agencies. Both recommendations present certain problems of refinement and specificity primarily because of the sensitive national security aspects of frequency
allocation. Problems of this kind, however, have been faced and met
successfully in other contexts, and should be soluble here. First, we
shall be more specific on our recommendation concerning "one institution" decision-making in allocating frequencies among all competing
uses, indicating reasons for our choice among possible competing systems,
and secondly, regarding the rule-making procedures which appear to be
most conducive to the wisest determinations.
(1) One Institution Decision-Making in Allocating Frequencies Among
All Competing Uses
The problem of choosing among possible repositories for the task of
deciding allocations of frequencies between Federal Government and
civilian use is not easy. Indeed, the fact that no solution has yet been
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found to the unsatisfactory situation which has persisted for over thirty
years-bifurcated control-may be due in no small part to the difficulty in
deciding who should be the decision-maker in allocating frequencies
among these competing uses. Proposed solutions have ranged from
assigning the task to the Federal Communications Commission, to the
creation of a "super-board" above the FCC and the DTM-IRAC with
or without an appeal to the President, to the establishment of one "super"
man above the FCC-DTM-IRAC with or without such appeal.
For various reasons, none has commanded sufficient support. The
military agencies, for example, have questioned the FCC as the overall
decision-maker since the FCC has been identified over the years so
closely with allocation among civilian users. On the other hand, civilian
users have tended to view solutions other than the FCC as decisionmaker, including those involving appeals to the President by Federal
Government users, with the gravest suspicion on the ground that they
would give the appearance but not the substance of objective decisionmaking.
Certainly this kind of problem is not new. In recent years there have
been two very prominent analogues, involving two different solutions.
An examination of these solutions to similar problems, involving the
Federal Aviation Agency and the Atomic Energy Commission, may be
helpful.
A. The Federal Aviation Agency
The background of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958' bears such a
strong resemblance to the frequency allocation problems which we have
been investigating as to be almost eerie. The House Report on the bill
which became that Act recounts the early history of airspace control
in the United States:
The first basic Federal aviation statute was the Air Commerce Act of 1926. It placed responsibility for the regulation of
air commerce on the Secretary of Commerce. However, it gave
the President authority to make airspace reservations for national defense or other governmental purposes. It authorized
the Secretary of War to designate military airways. Thus, a
pattern of division of responsibility in air-safety rulemaking
and the allocation of navigational airspace was established, to
plague civil and military air operations down to the present
time, with the Department of Defense, the Department of Commerce, the Civil Aeronautics Board, and the President having
authority in this field.
As air commerce continued to grow and encounter new opera1. 49 U.S.C. 1341 ff. (1963) P.L. 85-726, 72 Stat. 737.
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tional problems, the inadequacy of the Air Commerce Act
became apparent.2
Congress responded by passing the Civil Aeronautics Act in 1938.
But its administration was divided between the Civil Aeronautics Board
and the Civil Aeronautics Authority, and "divided authority over airspace
use forced the executive branch to resort to the -committee method to
solve or attempt to solve, conflicts over airspace allocations." ' In 1946,
Executive Order 9781 created the Air Coordinating Committee. This
Committee, the House Report continues, "which can act only by unanimous consent, came to play an important role in airspace control, and
diluted further the role of" 4 the CAA and the CAB:
Under this system, airspace has been assigned on a caseby-case basis often resulting in delays and patch-work solutions
to many critical airspace problems. For example, this Committee, in its investigation of the Grand Canyon accident, found
that establishment of an airway over the heavily traveled route
over Grand Canyon was being delayed by objections of the
military made through an Air Coordinating Committee panel.
Clearly an agency is needed now to develop a sound national
policy regarding use of navigable airspace by all users--civil
and military. This agency must combine under an independent
administrative head functions in that field now exercised by
the President, the Department of Defense, the Department
of Commerce, and the Civil Aeronautics Board.5
What galvanized the Executive Branch and the Congress into acute
realization of the need for one agency to "develop a sound national
policy regarding use of navigable aerospace by all users"? As the House
Report recognizes, the 1958 Federal Aviation Act was not "hastily conceived legislation." Rather,
"the magnitude and critical nature of the problem came first to
general public notice, perhaps, as a result of the midair collision of two airliners over Grand Canyon on June 30, 1956, when
128 lives were lost. Following this disaster were fatal air crashes
between civil and military aircraft operating under separate
flight rules established in the Civil Air Regulations. '
On June 13, 1958, the President, following two studies made during
the prior three years, submitted a message to Congress recommending
2. House Report No. 2360 to accompany S. 3880, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 1958, 1958
U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News 3741, 3743.
3. Note 2 at 3743.
4. Ibid.
5. Id. at 3744.
6. Id. at 3742.
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the creation of an independent federal aviation agency (H. Doc. 406,
85th Cong., 2d Sess.). In that message, the President said:
Recent midair collisions of aircraft, occasioning tragic losses
of human life, have emphasized the need for a system of air
traffic management which will prevent, within the limits of
human ingenuity, a recurrence of such accidents.
In this message, accordingly, I am recommending to the Congress the establishment of an aviation organization in which
would be consolidated among other things all the essential management functions necessary 7to support the common needs of
our civil and military aviation.
Perhaps allocation of radio frequencies would have long since been
made the task of a single agency if the defects of bifurcated control
were as visibly and dramatically disastrous as Grand Canyon midair
aircraft collisions.
Having decided to place in one agency the responsibility for control
of all uses of the airspace, the Executive and the Congress were by no
means at the end of their problem. "The question of the extent and
nature of military participation in the new agency was perhaps the most
difficult one faced by the Committee," the House Report avers. How
was it solved? The House Report describes the process:
Integration of Department of Defense activity in the field
of air traffic control into the new agency is important in the
interest not only of the efficient use of air space, with its important national defense connotations, but it's urgently needed
for reasons of governmental economy. (The committee was
told that the Department of Defense now has approximately
18,000 persons in this work, while the Civil Aeronautics Administration employs some 17,400 persons.)
Witnesses heard by the subcommittee were in agreement
that the new agency should be under the direction of a civilian
administrator, who must take into consideration the needs of
military aviation.
The intent of this legislation is to establish a civilian agency,
under the direction of a civilian administrator.
Personnel of the agency, civilian and military alike, must be
responsible solely to the Administrator.
In response to a question on this point during the hearings,
Mr. Quesada said7. Ibid.
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. . . The original language provides for an adviser. And as I

interpret it, personnel would be assigned to the adviser, and I
think that is something less than best. I do not want the military
personnel in this agency to be taking instructions from the Military Establishment. I do not want them to bring the specialized
interests of the Military Establishment to this agency. I want
them to bring to this agency the knowledge that they have
accumulated by having been in the Military Establishment.
I want their loyalty to be undiluted and to the Administrator
and the Administrator alone. We have, therefore, suggested this
language, 'Appointment to, acceptance of, and service as
Deputy Administrator, or under such cooperative agreement,
shall in no way affect status, office, rank, or grade which commissioned officers or enlisted men may occupy or hold, or any
emolument, perquisite, right, privilege, or benefit incident to
or arising out of such status or office, rank or grade.'
But the important point, is 'No person so detailed or appointed shall be subject to direction by or control by the Department from which detailed or appointed or by any agency or
officer thereof directly or indirectly with respect to his responsibilities under this act or within the Federal Aviation Agency.'
We are trying to have these people have the same relative
status as a civil-service person who is assigned to the Agency.8
Mr. Quesada thus clearly expressed the intent of this legislation
regarding military participation in this agency.9
Thus, the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 established unitary, one-agency
control under an Administrator with a Deputy Administrator possessing
a military background. 10 The legislation further provided that (1) in the
event of war, the President by Executive Order may transfer to the
Department of Defense any functions of the Agency, and (2) the FAA
Administrator and the Secretary of Defense, and the FAA Administrator
and the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, were to establish by "cooperative arrangement suitable arrangements for the timely exchange of information pertaining to their programs, policies, and requirements directly relating to the" responsibilities
of the FAA Administrator under the Act."
To what extent is this system applicable to radio frequency allocation?
Before answering, it would be well to examine the other recent analogue
for any insights it may impart.
8. Id. at 3748.
9. Ibid.
10. Id. at 3749; see 49 U.S.C. 1342 (1963).
11. 49 U.S.C. 1343(b) (1963).
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The Atomic Energy Commission

In the atomic energy area, there was nothing like the decades of
experience, unhappy though some of it was, in airspace control. There
were indeed a few short years of experience in the Manhattan District,
during wartime, which was hardly a blueprint for the long future of
atomic energy development in the interest of the welfare and the security
of the people of the United States, and of world peace.
The task facing Congress was nothing less than "to direct the development of atomic energy in such a way as to improve the public welfare,
increase the standard of living, strengthen free competition in private
enterprise, and promote world peace," all subject to the "paramount
objective of assuring the national defense and security."12 To carry out
these purposes, the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 provided for government
control over atomic energy and for government programs of "information, production, research, and development," 13 and for an Atomic
Energy Commission as the principal administrative body responsible
for "administering domestic control over atomic energy, for carrying on
production, research, and development programs, and for stimulating and
supporting private research and development."1 4
The decision to have an Atomic Energy Commission, however, immediately raised the issue of whether it should have a civilian or a military
complexion. The Congress and the Executive were clear that it should
be the former. As stated by the Report of the Special Senate Committee
on Atomic Energy on the bill which became the Atomic Energy Act of
1946:
The decision to limit membership eligibility to civilians was
adopted by the committee in keeping with established traditions
of our Government. It accords with principles cherished and
maintained throughout American history. Departure from these
principles has occasioned judicial, executive, and legislative
disapproval. This is not to say that the committee fails to
recognize legitimate and important areas of atomic energy
development and control touching on the responsibilities of the
military departments. Indeed, throughout the bill, wherever
these areas are involved, provision is made for full military
participation, and independent activities of the military departments, especially in research and development, are not infringed
but expressly encouraged."
12. Senate Report No. 1211 to accompany S. 1717, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 1946, 1946
U.S. Code Cong. Service 1327-1328.
13. Note 12 at 1328.
14. Note 12.
15. Note 12.
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However, having made this fundamental decision to adhere to "established traditions" of civilian control, the Committee also perceived the
desirability of giving the armed forces "a proper voice" in such matters
as the development, manufacture, storage, and use of bombs, which
occupied at that time about 95% of the time, funds and energy of the
program. 6 (The division of the radio spectrum is estimated to be
approximately equal as between Federal Government and civilian use.)
The solution was set forth as follows:
A Military Liaison Committee appointed by the Secretaries
of War and Navy is to consult with the Commission on all
activities relating to the military applications of atomic energy.
This provision has been adopted to give the armed forces a
proper voice in such matters as development, manufacture,
storage, and use of bombs; allocations of fissionable materials
for military research; control of information relating to the
manufacture and use of atomic weapons. Upon receiving the
recommendations of the Military Liaison Committee the Secretaries of War and Navy may at their own discretion carry to
the President a protest against any of the Commission's actions
or failures to act in reference to the matters described. In such
event, final decisions as to the course of action of the Commission relating to matters for which the War and Navy Departments have responsibility are made by the President."
The 1954 Amendment to the 1946 Act was quite extensive, but not in
respect of this question. It changed the 1946 Act's organizational provisions only by (a) establishing as one of eleven program divisions, the
Division of Military Application, to be headed by an active member of
the armed forces, and (b) lodging in the Department of Defense, rather
than the Military Liaison Committee, the responsibility of taking
exception to action or proposed action of the Commission, and thereby
referring the matter to the President for resolution.
What light is cast upon our problem of selection of the one-agency
decision-maker by the FAA and AEC solutions of analogous problems?
Three major contributions to the solution of our problem seem to
emerge from these recent experiences. The first is that in an area where
civilian and military uses are in competition, it is of great importance
to maintain our "established tradition" of civilian control. In both the
FAA and the AEC cases, though military uses of the airspace and of
atomic energy, respectively, were undeniably of great, if not, in the latter,
16. Senate Report No. 1699 to accompany S. 3690, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 1954 U.S.
Code Cong. and Adm. News 3456, 3458.
17. Note 12 at 1329.
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of overwhelming, security significance, a most deliberate decision to
maintain the tradition of civilian control which has served us so well
since the earliest days of the Republic was made and adhered to. Nor
has there been the slightest indication since those decisions that our
security has been adversely affected.
Secondly, where there is an important security interest at stake,
civilian control has not meant complete elimination of the influence
of military considerations from decision-making where these may be
competing interests. The placing of a military man in an important
second position in the FAA, which is headed by an Administrator, and the
establishment of a Military Liaison Committee with right of appeal by
the Department of Defense to the President in the case of the AEC
are earnest of a desire to be certain that security considerations shall not
be short-weighted.
Thirdly, the differing techniques of assuring military participation
tend to reflect the difference in administrative structure where there is a
single Administrator as compared with a Commission. In the first case,
a strongly placed second man can give needed assurance, while in the
second, a connection to a person or to an agency such as the Defense
Department with access to the President, rather than a single adviser to
a Commission, appears to be most suitable.
If an administrative organization corresponding to this experience
is to be applied to the frequency allocation problem, what would -the
structure comprise?
1. For the one-agency decision-maker, the choice lies between the
FCC or a single Administrator who would be a combined DTM and FCC
so far as determining amongst competing Federal Government and civilian uses is concerned. The argument for the FCC, and against an FAAtype Administrator in this context, however, is strong. The FCC is and
has been the regulatory agency for the entire spectrum, with the sole
exception of licensing Federal Government stations, for over 30 years.
Unlike the CAB-CAA structure, there has been an intended centralization
of responsibility for all aspects of spectrum management in the FCC,
but for this one area of Federal Government use. The CAB always was
envisioned as the regulatory agency for commercial uses of airspace, not
as the agency to exercise overall authority to assign airspace and otherwise regulate in the non-commercial area as well.
Moreover, there is no reason a priori to think that the planning for
maximum utilization of the spectrum would be more successfully
performed under a single Administrator, with a subsidiary FCC and
DTM-IRAC. The AEC has appeared to perform overall atomic energy
utilization through a General Manager at least as ably as the FAA Administrator has performed this aspect of his functions.
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Finally, the nature of the problem-a concern that neither military
nor civilian uses will be short-weighted-appears to call for retention of
the agency which has developed great experience in weighing competing claims to allocation of frequencies in rule-making proceedings, and
to look to other safeguarding techniques to avoid underweighting security
considerations. This seems to be particularly desirable in view of the
fact that civilian commissions, such as the AEC, have not hitherto
demonstrated callous disregard of security matters. In fact, a good case
may be made that they are so conscious of the possibility that they may
be charged with the offense that they bend over backwards.
2. If the FCC is to be given the task of deciding frequency allocations among all competing uses, as recommended above, what safeguarding techniques should be employed in order to assure that security
considerations have "a proper voice" in the determination of frequency
allocations? If it is difficult to envision a single adviser to or associate
of a commission as having a voice equal to that of the entire commission
-if a FAA "second man" cannot work-it seems clear that a mechanism
something like that of the AEC's Military Liaison Committee-Defense
Department is in order.
The choice on this score, in the context of frequency allocation,
appears to be between having (a) each disappointed Federal Government
agency being able to take its disappointment at the hands of the FCC
to the President for resolution, (b) only the Defense Department but
not other federal agencies being able to do so, or (c) only the Director of
Telecommunications Management, advised by IRAC, having such
access to the President for decision on the frequency allocation where
FCC has decided for civilian use and a federal agency is dissatisfied.
To allow each disappointed federal agency to have access to the
President (course a), regardless of the views of his DTM, appears
to be quite an unwarranted administrative burden upon him, and not
conducive to good management. While a respectable case can be made
for the proposition that only the Defense Department for security
reasons, not the Forest Service for firefighting reasons, should be able to
secure a second hearing from the President (course b), this might be
too sharp a break from the past. Moreover, not only the Defense Department is involved in communications of a security character. The Coast
Guard, part of the Treasury Department in peacetime, cannot be
excluded from the security area, and the same might be said of other
agencies or parts thereof as well.
Accordingly, it would seem sensible to adopt course c-authorizing
the Director of Telecommunications Management, advised by IRAC,
to request the FCC to withhold final action allocating frequencies to a
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competing civilian use, pending referral of the contested Federal Government-civilian use controversy to the President for decision.
It may and perhaps will be protested that such a system would throw
all such contests to the President, who would in effect delegate decisionmaking to his DTM, who in turn would defer to the requesting Federal
Government agency, and hence civilian use would receive short shrift
at the end of a lengthy journey.
While of course this may be a possibility, it is nonetheless highly
unlikely. For if Congress were to legislate the changes in the Federal
Communication Act which would be necessary to create the system herein
recommended, it would be making it quite clear to all agencies and to
the President that it expected the FCC's frequency allocation determination to be the final decision except in the unusual case where the President,
upon the carefully considered advice of his DTM, was convinced that
an important national interest urgently demanded that the FCC be
overridden. In consequence, it is very doubtful that the DTM would
seek to have the President overturn every FCC determination which
might be less than satisfactory to the requesting federal agency, and still
more unlikely that the President would do so even were he so advised.
In any event, the fact that a system may be capable of being utilized
in a manner inconsistent with the intentions of its begetters is not persuasive that it is a poor mechanism-it may mean merely, should it be
so used, that steps to correct its misuse should then be undertaken. The
alternative-to fail to provide for appeal to the President where it is
fervently believed that important security interests are at stake and have
been underweighted-appears to be quite infeasible under present circumstances.
(2) Procedures in Frequency Allocation Among All Users
As we have seen in Parts II and III, the FCC procedures in allocating
frequencies among competing civilian uses are the familiar rule-making
procedures which the APA and the FCC Act itself have long prescribed
and which the FCC, in common with other major regulatory agencies,
has long followed. It is plain that these procedures are wholly appropriate in the FCC determination of frequency allocations among all
competing uses, including those requested by Federal Government
agencies.
While, of course, security information must be able to be withheld
from public scrutiny, this poses no problem in rule-making proceedings.
The APA and the FCC Act permit wide discretion in the administrative
agency to do so. Thus, section 4 of the APA specifically states that its
notice and public procedure provisions are not applicable where the
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agency "for good cause finds

.

that [they] are . . . contrary to the

public interest."
Even if adjudication were involved, the problem of security information can and has been handled quite well with a "minimum impairment
of procedural rights." For example, section 181 of the Atomic Energy
Act (42 U.S.C. § 2231) requires applicability of the APA to all AEC
"agency action" in licensing, except that where proceedings involve
"Restricted Data or defense information," regulations shall provide
"parallel procedures as will effectively safeguard" such data or information from unauthorized persons "with minimum impairment of the procedural rights which would be available" if such data or information were
not involved. And the AEC followed this directive with regulations (10
CFC. Subpart I, Sec. 2.900 ff.) which appear to meet these objectives
quite successfully.
Perhaps the major question concerning the procedures to be followed
in allocations of frequencies among all users, including Federal Government users, is not the nature of the rule-making procedures which the
FCC would utilize-these are well-known and standardized. Rather, it
is the question of the role of DTM-IRAC in, and its relationship to, the
FCC rule-making procedure leading to the proposed FCC frequency
allocation.
While the internal administrative structure for the allocation of frequencies among Federal Government agencies is, strictly speaking, outside the scope of this study except to the extent that it affects allocation
between Federal Government and civilian uses, some observations may
nonetheless be relevant. In view of the large number and great variety
of Federal Government users and uses, the desire to avoid unnecessary
competition between them and by a number of them in contest before
the FCC with civilian users, and the need to achieve the most effective
administration of the spectrum by the FCC, it would appear to be most
wise to retain the basic DTM-IRAC structure and to strengthen it
materially. Federal Government agency applications for frequencies
should be screened by DTM-IRAC more effectively than hitherto, so
that both DTM and the concerned agency will be in a position to make
an effective case before the FCC in competition with civilian use applicants. One means of accomplishing this strengthening of DTM-IRAC
justification procedures might be a requirement that the requesting
Federal Government agency show endorsement of its application by the
DTM in the rule-making proceeding before the FCC.
These recommendations are not earth-shaking. They are designed
to apply to the frequency allocation problem the techniques which have
worked successfully for so long in closely analogous fields. Their purpose
is to terminate the most unfortunate division of responsibility and deep
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dissatisfaction therewith which has for so long persisted in frequency
allocation between Federal Government and civilian use, and thereby to
achieve unified and centralized spectrum management in the public
interest. There is no magic, of course, in structures or organizations or
procedures-they must all be operated by men. But structures and
organizations and procedures can help or they can hinder men. Those
which we have recommended we firmly believe to be in the former
category, just as those which now exist appear to be in the latter.

